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OKLAHOMA
LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 49

WINTER, 1996

NUMBER 4

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION: THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE TENTH CIRCUIT
FRitz SNYDER*

Introduction

Ever since Justice Antonin Scalia took his place on the Supreme Court in 1986, one
area of continuing controversy has been the use of legislative history in determining
legislative intent. Although the issue has been around a long time, it achieved new life
and new prominence in 1986. Well over a hundred law review articles have appeared
on this topic in the last ten years. Despite the plethora of articles, very few of them
have done any kind of statistical analysis on how the debate and controversy have
affected the Supreme Court's interpretation of statutes. Thus, I analyzed all the cases
for the calendar year 1995 to see how heavily legislative history was used to interpret
statutes. Given the fact that the Supreme Court (or at least individual members) may
have altered its views on the uses of legislative history, how has that affected other
federal courts? I decided, then, to take one federal circuit court (the Tenth Circuit

*
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1. However, William Eskridge says the "annus mirabilis" for the renaissance was 1982 when J.
WILLARD HURST, DEALING wrrH STATUTES (1982); GuIDo CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE
OF STATUrEs (1982); Ronald Dworkin, Law as Interpretation,60 TEx. L. REv. 527 (1987); and Richard
A. Posner, Economics, Politics,and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitution, 49 U. Cm. L. REv.
263 (1982), were all published. See WILuAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
335 n.1 (1994).
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Court of Appeals). and analyze all of its cases for 1995 to see how it deals with
legislative history.
In addition, because I discovered from my analysis that legislative history continues
to play an important role in interpreting statutes and because I have often been asked
how to find federal legislative history, I believe it useful to explain how to do
legislative history research and how to find legislative history materials (see Appendix
C). Based on my empirical study of 1995 Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit cases, I
have been able to determine what legislative materials are important and what are
essentially irrelevant.
To lay the framework, I will first discuss the different theories of statutory
interpretation, noting how legislative history fits into the picture, and observing the
reliance on dictionares for interpreting words and phrases. Also, it is necessary to see
what use is being rmade of administrative interpretations of statutes and how that ties
in with legislative history. Finally, while Justice Scalia deserves particular attention,
the views of the other justices concerning statutory interpretation and legislative
history receive scrutiny as well.
Turning to the theories of statutory interpretation, one commentator has noted that
"[o]ne must have a theory, or at least a defensible and replicable method, to resolve
hard statutory cases." Without a theory or a replicable method, a judge will be
unpredictable and inconsistent in his or her approach to statutory interpretation. There
are essentially three theories. Intentionalism directs the interpreter to "discover or
replicate the legislature's original intent as the answer to an interpretive question."3
Purposivism, the second theory, says that statutory ambiguities can be resolved by
identifying the purpse or objective of the statute and then by determining which
interpretation is most consistent with that goal.4 Both intentionalism and purposivism
rely on legislative history.
The third theory, textualism, argues that the beginning and, usually, the end of
statutory interpretation should be the apparent meaning of the statutory language. 5
"The simplest version of textualism is enforcement of the 'plain meaning' of the
statutory provision; that is, given the ordinary meanings of words and accepted
precepts of grammar and syntax, what does the provision signify to the reasonable
person?"' If the language has a plain meaning, a textualist court will usually not
analyze any evidence of what the statute means. The court will usually not consider
evidence extrinsic to - that is, outside of - the statute.7 The plain meaning
interpretation seeks to identify the impact that statutory language would have to a

2. Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The Revival of Theory in Statutory
Interpretation,77 MINN. L. REv. 241, 262 (1992).
3. EsKRIDGE, supra note 1, at 14.
4. See id. at 25-26.
5. See id. at 34.
6. Id.at 38.
7.See HELENE SHAPo & MARSHALL SHAPO, LAW SCHOOL WrrHOUT FEAR: STRATEOIES FOR
SuccEss 69 (1996).
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typical lay reader In this context, then, ordinary dictionaries play an important role?
The one well-recognized exception to the plain meaning rule, even among its strongest
adherents, is where a construction of the words would lead to an absurd result."0
One problem with the plain meaning rule is that what is plain to one judge is not
plain to another. One particularly striking example of this concerned two of the very
strongest adherents of the plain meaning rule, Justice Scalia and Judge Kozinski of the
Ninth Circuit, who could not agree whether a gun used as barter in a drug transaction
was used "in relation to... [a] drug trafficking crime."" Kozinski argued that the
plain language of the statute so clearly covered gun-for-drugs trades that resort to
legislative history was unnecessary. 2 He did not address whether trading a gun for
drugs was "using" a firearm within the meaning of the statute. With respect to the "in
relation to" language, Kozinski said:
It is difficult to think of a term broader than "in relation to"; I can
envision no plausible interpretation of the phrase that would place Phelps
beyond the reach of section 924(c) .... The panel's refusal to apply the
statute to a fact situation squarely covered by the clear statutory language,
and the full court's failure to correct the error, raise a fundamental
question: Is there any law that the courts cannot circumvent through
creative "interpretation"? The answer apparently is no. 3
Interpreting the same statutory section in a different case, Justice Scalia said that the
statute clearly did not apply to gun-for-drugs trades, based on the "ordinary meaning"
of its terms. 4 John Polich commented: "Kozinski and Scalia appeared to agree on
only one thing - that the meaning of the statute should be obvious to anyone who
reads it."' 5 In addition to Justice Scalia and Judge Kozinski, the more outspoken
and
supporters of textualism include Judge Frank Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit
6
Judges Kenneth Starr and James Buckley of the District of Columbia Circuit.

8. See Note, Looking It Up: Dictionariesand Statutory Interpretation,107 HARV. L. REV. 1437,
1441 (1994) [hereinafter Looking It Up].
9. See infra text accompanying notes 104-26.
10. If the words of a statute are clear, and the construction of those words will not lead to an absurd

result, the words are assumed to be the "final expression of the meaning intended." United States v.
Missouri Pac. R.R., 278 U.S. 269, 278 (1929).
11. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (1994).
12. See United States v. Phelps, 895 F.2d 1281, 1283 (9th Cir. 1990) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from
denial of rehearing en banc).
13. Id.
14. See Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 242-46 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
15. John Polich, The Ambiguity of Plain Meaning: Smith v. United States and the New Textualism,
68 S. CAL L. REV. 259, 282 (1994).
16. See id. at 272; see also Robert J. Araujo, The Use of Legislative History in Statutory
Interpretation:A Recurring Question- Clarificationor Confusion? 16 SEroN HALL LEGIs. J. 551, 603
(1992). Araujo notes the following cases and judges in particular In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1343
(7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook, J.); International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 814 F.2d 697, 715 (D.C.
Cir 1987) (Buckley, J., concurring); Federal Election Comn'n v. Rose, 806 F.2d 1081, 1090 (D.C. Cir.
1986) (Starr, J.); Wallace v Christensen, 802 F.2d 1539, 1557 (9th Cir. 1986) (Kozinski, J., concurring).
See Araujo, supra, at 582 n.162.
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One area where textualism appears to enjoy a definite advantage over legislative
history analysis is its potential for reducing research and litigation costs. Under the
textualist approach, lawyers need only consult the statutory text found in the official
or unofficial United States Codes. For additional guidance, they could consult a
standard dictionary (not even a law dictionary), related provisions in the same statutory
code, or any cases analyzing the code section, Time-consuming efforts looking for
committee reports, committee hearings, and floor debate would be unnecessary. 7
Textualism also is appealing because the "intent" of the Congress with respect to
a word or phrase or section of a statute can be such an elusive thing. This is an
outgrowth of public choice theory, in which the "methodology of economics is applied
to the democratic marketplace of the legislature."'" Public choice theory seeks to
demonstrate that legislators frequently were not "reasonable persons pursuing
reasonable purposes reasonably."' 9 Also, statutes frequently did not embody broad
public policy purposes and were often the result of no more than compromises, often
involving special interest groups." Thus, Judge Easterbrook has argued that
"legislatures cannot have intents or purposes."'" For Easterbrook, legislatures "have
'only outcomes,' not 'intents' or 'designs.""
On the other hand, "[o]ne might argue that while Justice Scalia's rhetoric of
deference to text.., evokes a humble, subservient role for the judiciary, the reality
is that his brand of textualism arrogates to the judiciary a power to frustrate
legislative... frameworks."' Things would be much easier if it were only a simple,
objective test to discover the plain meaning of a word or a phrase or a section of a
statute. The Scalia-Kozinski conflict? shows that this is not always possible.
Legislative History
Legislative histor plays a role in both the theories of purposivism and intentionalism. However, four main arguments oppose reliance on legislative history to
interpret statutes. First, reliance on legislative history may substitute the will of
committees or indiv. dual legislators for that of the entire body. Second, legislative
history is not signed by the President and represents, at best, the will of only one of
the three branches of government. Third, legislative history is unavailable to the
average practitioner.' Fourth, as noted previously, how can one really know what

17. See Polich, supra note 15, at 278.
18. Frickey, supra note 2, at 250.
19. Id.

20.
21.
(1983)).
22.
23.

See id.
Id. at 252 (citing Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHl. L. REV. 533, 547-48
Id. at 253 (quoting Easterbrook, supra note 21, at 547).
Deborah A. Geier, Commentary: Textualism and Tax Cases, 66 TEMP. L. REv. 445,458 (1993)

(footnotes omitted).

24. See supra text aeornpanying notes 11-15.
25. See Michael Livingston, Congress, the Courts and the Code: Legislative History and the
-Interpretationof Tax Sta'utes, 69 Tax. L. REv. 819, 819 (1991).

26. See supra text azcompanying notes 18-22.
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the intent of the Congress is with respect to a specific word, phrase, or section in a
statute?
One observer has argued that legislative history research is simply impractical for
most attorneys:
Legislative history requires extraordinary amounts of research. It
consists, at a minimum, of committee reports, conference reports, records
of committee hearings, floor statements, Presidential signing statements,
and all previous legislation or documents of any nature to which any of
the foregoing refer. Only the largest law libraries normally carry all these
materials, and the materials are generally not available at all outside major
metropolitan areas. Ordinarily all of the material must be read...
because there is no way of knowing in advance where something pertinent
may be found. If a lawyer were required to become knowledgeable in the
legislative history of a statute he was interpreting in order to be regarded
as having acted with professional competence, most of the lawyers in this
country would be guilty of malpractice. "7
This bleak view even extends to the lower courts: "[C]ompared to most lower courts
the Supreme Court has a luxury of time, a superb library, an army of law clerks, a
wealth of legislative history and a large body of legal briefs to inform its interpretive
inquiry. '
These negative views are clearly overstated although they do emphasize the
confusion that surrounds the search for legislative history. I have sought to alleviate
this confusion in my Appendix C to this article concerning legislative history
research.' For example, finding committee reports can really be quite simple if the
researcher is aware that statutory sections in the UnitedStates Code Annotated contain
cross references to the widely available West publication United States Code
Congressionaland AdministrativeNews which reprints the full text (or most of the full
text) of the most important committee reports, including conference committee reports,
for the last fifty years. "Legislative history is not difficult to find, at least not for the
lawyer trying to understand an unclear statute." 0
Textualists argue that the only legitimate use of legislative history is to correct
mistakes, usually ambiguities, in statutory language?' "The argument in favor of
using legislative history, simply put, is that context is important to the ascertainment
32
of meaning, and legislative history is an important part of context." Or, as another
commentator has said:

27. W. David Slawson, Legislative History and the Need to Bring Statutory InterpretationUnder
the Rule of Law, 44 STAN. L. REv. 383, 408 (1992).
28. James P. Nehf, Textualism in the Lower Courts: Lessons from Judges InterpretingConsumer
Legislation, 26 RtrrGERS L.J. 1, 6 (1994).

29. See infra appendix C.
30. Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History inInterpretingStatutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV.
845, 869 (1992). When Justice Breyer wrote this article, he was a judge on the First Circuit.
31. See Slawson, supra note 27, at 423.
32. Livingston, supra note 25, at 38.
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Legislative history may be useful in filling the gap. The history can
supply information about how the statute is expected to operate, what
subjects it addresses, what problems it seeks to solve, what objectives
it tries to accomplish, and what means it employs to reach those
objectives - all of which the judge may draw upon in testing his
tentative construction of the statutory language.33
Courts often use legislative histories principally to determine the relevant purpose,
rather than the specific intent,behind the enactment of a statute or particular statutory
provision.' "The ccurt then interprets the statute to best fulfill that purpose."" The
legislative history of a statute is authoritative historical evidence because it is a
contemporary record made by the enacting legislators. However, crystal-clear
legislative history on an interpretive issue is rare.
In the real world, before lawyers give advice to clients about what a statute means,
they look (or, at least, should look) at the text of the statute, at cases interpreting the
statute, at any legi;lative history that is reasonably at hand, at the overall legal
landscape - and then apply the "lessons of common sense and good policy."3 This
is in contrast to law professors who talk about grand theories.38 Judges' approaches
in their interpretations of a statute are more like lawyers' approaches. 9 Legislative
histories may be used to rationalize interpretations reached on other grounds, but this
is often true when cases are cited as well.'4 Courts often use legislative history to
confirm their interpretation of the text of a statute.4!'
When an issue is not politically sensitive, courts do well to rely on specific
statements in the legislative history which elaborate on statutory detail.42 "Legislators
should take responsibility for resolving [politically sensitive] ... issues in the statutory
text, rather than running the risk that private interest groups will manipulate the result
through legislative history."43' Also, "[t]he attraction of relying on such legislative

33. A. Raymond Rrndolph, Dictionaries,Plain Meaning, and Context in Statutory Interpretation,
17 HARv. J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y 71, 77 (1994).
34. See Peter C. Schanck, The Only Game in Town: An Introduction to Interpretive Theory,
Statutory Construction, and Legislative Histories,38 U. KAN. L. REv. 815, 819 (1990).
35. Id.
36. See Williams N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical
Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 356 (1990).
37. Id. at 321.
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. See Peter C. Scbanck, The Uses and Values ofLegislative Histories:A Reply, 82 L. LIBR. J. 303,
304 (1990).
41. See Paul T. Lawless, City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund: Justice Scalia's Evolution

of the Plain MeaningApproach as Applied to RCRA's Household Exemption, 22 N. Ky. L. REv. 115,
131 (1995) (citing Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 237 (1994) (Blackmun, J.) ("[Ihe
legislative history of the Mine Act confirms [the] interpretation.")).
42. See William D. Popkin, Foreword:Nonjudicial Statutory Interpretation,66 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
301, 315-16 (1990).
43. Id. at 315.
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history is especially strong in very technical areas of the law."" Bankruptcy and
taxation are examples of such technical areas. At least in bankruptcy cases, the
Supreme Court tends to entertain issues only where the lower courts have split on an
issue' The lower courts often engage in a more dynamic approach to statutory
interpretation than'mere textualism. In many cases the lower courts have analyzed the
competing policies (with the use of legislative history) and have reached different
results."
When legislative history is used to interpret statutes, what parts of legislative history
are most useful? "Both hearings and floor statements have been described as 'the more
diffused, less critical parts of the [legislative] process,' and both usually take a back
seat to committee report explanations."47 According to William Eskridge, the
Supreme Court has worked out a rough hierarchy of legislative history sources, based
on a series of questions on the comparative reliability of each source." "How likely
does the source reflect the views or assumptions of the enacting Congress? Is there
a danger of strategic manipulation by individual Members or biased groups seeking
49
'
to 'pack' the legislative history? How well-informed is the source?" Eskridge and
Philip Frickey worked out the following hierarchy (most authoritative to least
authoritative):
Committee Reports
Sponsor Statements
Rejected Proposals
Floor & Hearing Colloquy
Views of Nonlegislator Drafters
Legislative Inaction
Subsequent Legislative History'
"No one claims that [legislative] history is always useful; only that it sometimes
helps."'" Judge A. Raymond Randolph, United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit, has commented that nearly every brief he sees in cases
involving issues of statutory interpretation contains references to legislative history.'
This is a wise precaution on the part of appellate advocates. Counsel can
never be sure that the court will find the [statutory] words plain, and stop

44. IL
45. See Robert K. Rasmussen, A Study of the Costs and Benefits of Textualism: The Supreme Court's
Bankruptcy Cases, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 535, 562, 594 (1993).
46. Id. at 594.
47. George A. Costello, Average Voting Members and Other "Benign Fictions". The Relative
Reliability of Committee Reports, Floor Debates,and OtherSources of Legislative History, 1990 DUKE
L.J. 39, 57-58 (quoting Stephanie Wald, Some Observationson the Use ofLegislative History in the 1981
Supreme CourtTerm, 68 IOWA L. REv. 195, 202 (1982)).
48. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REv. 621, 636 (1990).
49. Id.
50. See id.
51. Breyer, supra note 30, at 862 (emphasis added).
52. See Randolph, supra note 33, at 76.
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there.... [Plerhaps the portions of the briefs discussing legislative history
ought to be placed under seal - to be opened if, and only if, the judge
certifies that the statute appears ambiguous after three readings. 3
The judge, of course, is alluding to the textualist notion that if the meaning is plain
no reference to the legislative history is permissible. Again, though, how is the lawyer
going to know that the judge will think the meaning "plain?" Justice Stephen Breyer
argues that using legislative history can:
(A) Help avoid an absurd result;
(B) Iluminate drafting errors;
(C) Help take account of specialized meanings;
(D) Help identify a "reasonable purpose"; and
(E)Help choose among reasonable interpretations of a politically controversial
statute.M
This is not to say that the uses of legislative history cannot be improved. "[T]here
is widespread agreement that official congressional documents are replete with
deceptive statements that suggest a congressional intent that does not in fact exist.'""
Stephen Ross suggests that the following modifications in congressional practices
would significantly reduce the likelihood that courts will be deceived by inaccurate
legislative history o-. will ignore legislative history for fear of such deception:
(A) Publish the transcript of markups;
(B) Have members sign committee reports;
(C) Expressly indicate why committee hearings and floor statements should be
authoritative; and
(D) Specify which remarks are directed at the courts.'
Committee reports, although usually considered the most reliable part of legislative
history, are viewed with disdain by Justice Scalia. He has said they convert "a system
of judicial construction into a system of committee-staff prescription.""7 In another
case, Justice Scalia stated that committee reports are unreliable, "not only as a genuine
indicator of congressional intent but as a safe predictor of judicial construction."" He
also noted how insignificant a committee's opinion on an issue is in relation to the
whole Congress ' "All we know for sure is that the full Senate adopted the text that
we have before us here, as did the full House .... and that that text ...became
law.... [I]t would be better still to stop confusing [the courts], and not to use
committee reports at all."' Scalia also complains: "We use them [(committee
reports)] when it is convenient, and ignore them when it is not."'" Judge Kozinski

53. Id.
54. See Breyer, supra note 30, at 848-61.
55. Stephen F. Ross, Where Have You Gone, Karl Llewellyn? Should CongressTurn Its Lonely Eyes
to You?, 45 VAND. L. REv. 561, 575 (1992).
56. See id.at 575-77.
57. Hirschey v. FERC, 777 F.2d 1, 7-8 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).

58.
59.
60.
61.

Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 617 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
See id. at 620 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id. at 621 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id. at 617 (Scala, J.,
concurring).
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says that committee reports are usually written by staff or lobbyists, not legislators,
and that few legislators read the reports. 2 Moreover, he notes that the reports are not
voted on by the committee whose views they supposedly represent (only the
underlying bill is), much less by the full Congress, and they cannot be amended on
the floor by legislators who disagree with their content. Relying on such language
can "short-circuit the legislative process, leading to results never approved by Congress
or the President."'
Nontextualists' views about committee reports are a good deal different. Thus:
"[i]n the ordinary course of legislation, committee reports should be looked to for the
most coherent, thorough, and authoritative explanation of a bill's purpose and intended
meaning. To abandon altogether reliance on committee reports ... denies access to
the best source of congressional explanation."'6 Justice Brennan argued that,
ordinarily, committee reports are considered the most reliable and persuasive element
of legislative history.' When the Court looked to legislative sources in the 1992
Term, it considered a variety of materials. Committee reports were by far the most
relied-upon source, cited usually more than once in each of twenty-four of the cases
reviewed.!7 "Committee reports are ... properly treated as the most reliable type of
legislative history."' The committee report is generally the only written record
available to explain what action a committee has taken on a bill since transcripts of
committee markup sessions are not usually available.' In 1996 two authorities on
legal research, then, could still state: "Reports are generally the most important source
of legislative history."7 For legislative history sources actually used, hearings and
floor debate come in a distant second after committee reports.7'
Agency Interpretations
Legislative history also has a role in determining whether an agency interpretation
of a statute should be given deference. In 1984 the Supreme Court, in Chevron U.S.A.

62. See Wallace v. Christensen, 802 F.2d 1539, 1560 (9th Cir. 1986) (Kozinski, J., concurring).

63. Id. (Kozinski, J., concurring).
64. Id. (Kozinski, J., concurring).
65. Costello, supra note 47, at 72-73.
66. See Thomburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 43 n.7 (1986) (Brennan, J.) ("We have repeatedly
recognized that the authoritative source for legislative intent lies in the Committee Reports on the bill.").
67. See Stephanie Wald, The Use ofLegislative History in Statutory InterpretationCasesin the 1992
U.S. Supreme Court Term; Scalia Rails but Legislative History Remains on Track, 23 Sw. U. L. REV.
47, 58 (1993). In 1995 there were 43 references to committee reports in the 29 cases dealing with
statutory interpretation. See infra p. 594 (table).

68. Popkin, supra note 42, at 317.
69. See Costello, supra note 47, at 46.
70. MORRIS L. COHEN & KENT C. OLSON, LEGAL RESEARCH INA NUTSHELL 167 (6th ed. 1996).
71. "One might expect that hearings, being further removed from congressional decision points,
would be accorded less interpretational weight than floor debates. An examination of case law does not
reveal such a sharp distinction, however." Costello, supranote 47, at 57. In 1995, hearings were cited
to seven times and floor debate (the CongressionalRecord) was cited to eight times. See infra p. 594

(table).
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v. Natural Resources Defense Council, established a two-step test applicable to
judicial review of agency interpretations of agency-administered statutes:
First, always is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the
precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end
of the matter, for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court
determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at
issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the
statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative
interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to
the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute 3
One commentator has noted that the effect of Chevron has been to require a reviewing
court to give substantial deference to the agency decision in all cases except those in
which the intent of Congress is clear.74
And since legislative history can be used for determining whether the
intent of Congress is clear, the only practical way now for a reviewing
court to avoid the substantial deference it must otherwise give to an
agency decision is to claim to find a clear legislative intent in the
legislative history. Since Chevron, a reviewing court's use of legislative
history is practically assured if the court decides to reverse an agency
decision."
Judge Scalia has said that textualism, because of the greater restraints it imposes on
judges, should produce less deference to agency interpretations of law.76
How did the Chevron analysis fare in the Supreme Court in 1995? In Babbitt v.
Sweet Home Chapterof Communitiesfor a Great Oregon," parties brought an action
against the Secretary of the Interior and against the Fish and Wildlife Service,
challenging a regulation promulgated by the Secretary under the Endangered Species
Act. Justice Stevens, for the majority, said (because congressional intent was not
clear) the Secretary's interpretation was "reasonable suffice" to decide the case.78
"[Wie owe some degree of deference to the Secretary's reasonable interpretation."79
The proper interpretation of a term such as "harm" involves a complex
policy choice. When Congress has entrusted the Secretary with broad

72. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
73. ld.
at 842-43.
74. See Slawson, supra note 27, at 401.
75. Id.
76. See Antonin Soalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretationsof Law, 1989 DUKE
L.J. 511, 521.
77. 115 S. Ct. 2407 (1995).
78. See id. at 2416.
79. Id.
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discretion, we are especially reluctant to substitute our views of wise
policy for his. See Chevron, 467 U.S., at 865-866.... In this case, that
reluctance accords with our conclusion, based on the text, structure, and
legislative history of the ESA [Endangered Species Act], that the
Secretary reasonably construed the intent of Congress.'
Justice Scalia dissented, saying: "We defer to reasonable agency interpretations of
ambiguous statutes ... ."" In this case, then, he felt the agency interpretation was
not reasonable.
In Reno v. Koray,' Justice Rehnquist, writing for a unanimous court, said that the
Bureau of the Prison's internal agency guideline was entitled to some deference since
it was a "permissible construction of the statute."" In First Options v. Kaplan,"
Justice Breyer wrote: "The law, for example, tells all courts (trial and appellate) to
give administrative agencies a degree of legal leeway when they review certain
interpretations of the law that those agencies have made."' In Nationsbankof North
Carolina, N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co.," Justice Ginsburg, citing
Chevron, said: "[W]hen we confront an expert administrator's statutory exposition, we
inquire first whether 'the intent of Congress is clear' as to 'the precise question at
issue."" In ICC v. Transcon Lines,' Justice Kennedy, writing for a unanimous
court, said that the ICC regulation was entitled to deference as an interpretation of the
Interstate Commerce Act and cited Chevron.
One observer has said: "Appellate courts routinely accord deference to agency
construction of ambiguous language in agency-administered statutes. ' Judge Kelly
of the Tenth Circuit, however, said that the court need not accept an agency's
interpretation of its own regulations if such interpretation is 'unreasonable, plainly
erroneous, or inconsistent with the regulation's plain meaning'.'' In United States v.
Richards,' Judge Seymour, writing for the majority, said that the "mixture or
substance" to be measured in determining the sentence under the mandatory minimum
sentence statute for drug violation did not include waste byproducts. Judge Baldock
in a spirited dissent and citing Chevron said: "If Congress' intent is clear from the

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 2418.
dissenting).
d. at 2430 (Scalia, J.,
115 S. Ct. 2021 (1995).

Id. at 2027.
115 S. Ct. 1920 (1995).
Id. at 1926.
115 S. Ct. 810 (1995).
Id. at 813.
115 S. Ct. 689 (1995).

89. See idat 696.
90. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court's New Hypertextualism:An Invitation to Cacophony

and Incoherence in the Administrative State, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 749, 749-50 (1995). Pierce, in turn,
cited to Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal
Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984, 1058-59, for this statement.
91. Culbertson v. United States Dep't of Agric., 69 F.3d 465, 467 (10th Cir. 1995).
92. 67 F.3d 1531 (10th Cir. 1995).

93. See id. at 1537.
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statutory language, we give effect to that intent, our inquiry is complete, and we do
not turn to an agency construction.... Because § 841 does not define the terms
'mixture' or 'substance,' they must be given their ordinary meaning."' In Onwuneme
v. INS,95 Judge Baldock held that an alien's presence in the United States was no
longer "lawful" after the entry of the final order of deportation where an alien had
failed to satisfy the seven-year domicile requirement, and thus the Board of
Immigration Appeads had correctly held that the alien was ineligible for discretionary
relief from deportation.' The judge said that if the statute is subject to differing but
reasonable interpretations, the court is not free to impose its own construction upon
the statute: "[R]ather we ask whether the administrative agency's construction is
reasonable. If so, we defer to the agency's decision as permissible."" In Osborne v.
Babbitt," an Indian child was deemed to be the legitimate child of decedent's unwed
son and thus entitled to a share in his estate. Judge Tacha said that if the statute is
ambiguous or silent on the issue in question, the court "must determine whether the
agency's determination is based on a permissible construction of the statute .... We
may ascertain the intent of Congress through statutory language and legislative
history."' In Utah v. Babbitt," Judge Kelly said that because the court found
Congress' intent clear with respect to the statute under consideration, the court was
unable to subscribe to the agency's "narrow technical view."''
Thus, in 1995 the Supreme Court and the Tenth Circuit cited to the Chevron case
thirteen times. Clvron has not made a dramatic difference in the frequency with
which the courts defer to agency interpretations of statutes.'" Many had assumed the
Chevron framework would result in a greater degree of deference to agency
interpretations of statutes," but this was not the case - at least in 1995 in the
Supreme Court and in the Tenth Circuit.
Dictionaries
An interpreter oriented toward effectuating statutory purpose or legislative intent
would ideally look to interpretive tools contemporaneous with the drafting of the
statute under consideration'" - that is, legislative history. On the other hand, "a
consistent textualist would presumably focus on the way current readers might view
a statute"'" - that is, using an ordinary dictionary to define an unclear or am-

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
351, 359
103.
104.
105.

Id. at 1540 (Faldock, J., dissenting).
67 F.3d 273 (10th Cir. 1995).
See id, at 275.
Id. (citing Chevron).
61 F.3d 811 ([0th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 812.
53 F.3d 1145 (10th Cir. 1995).
See id. at 1149.
See Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Futureof the Chevron Doctrine,72 WASH. U. L.Q.
(1994).
See id. at 360.
See Looking It Up, supra note 8, at 1446-47.
Id.
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biguous word. The textualist method, with its search for the ordinary meaning
ascribed to words by the contemporaneous reader, probably leads to the dictionary
more often than does the approach that frames the inquiry in terms of legislative
intent." "[D]ictionary definitions, which report common usage, are often mentioned
in court opinions which are labeled as literal statutory applications.""
However, using ordinary dictionaries to define words and phrases presents its own
set of problems.
A... problem with dictionary meanings is their fundamental indeterminacy.... There are a wide variety of dictionaries from which to
choose, and all of them usually provide several entries for each word. The
selection of a particular dictionary and a particular definition is not
obvious and must be defended on some other grounds of suitability....
If multiple definitions are available, which one fits the way an ordinary
person would interpret the term?'"
"Difficulties arise from assuming that dictionaries provide perfect category boundaries
and then applying those boundaries to contexts never considered by the authors of the
dictionaries.""
Another fiction indulged in by the textualist is that Congress writes and
votes on statutes with a dictionary by its side. Textualist opinions
repeatedly invoke dictionary definitions of statutory text. Yet there is no
general statute passed by Congress which provides that all of its words
are to be construed according to their strict dictionary definitions. Nor is
there any evidence anywhere else... demonstrating the Congress has
generally incorporated a dictionary as the source for interpreting its work
product.... [T]extualism seems to include the unarticulated assumption
that Congress intends that its words will be analyzed according to their
strict dictionary definitions."'
Judge Learned Hand declared that "it is one of the surest indexes of a mature and
developed jurisprudence not to make a fortress out of the dictionary..""
In the quarter century between 1958 and 1983, the Supreme Court cited to
dictionaries on an average of five times per term."' In the six terms between 1987
and 1992, the Court never cited dictionaries fewer than fifteen times, with a high point
of thirty-two references during the 1992 Term."' By my count, the Court cited to

See Merrill, supra note 102, at 357.
NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRucrION § 46.02, at 92 (5th ed. 1992).
Looking It Up, supra note 8, at 1446.
Id. at 1452.
110. Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes: Toward a Factfinding Model of Statutory Interpretation,76 VA. L. REv. 1295, 1320-21 (1990).
111. Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1945), noted in Looking It Up, supra note 8,
at 1437.
112. See id. at 1438.
113. See id.; see also id. at 1454 app.
106.
107.
108.
109.
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dictionaries thirty times in 1995. Dictionary definitions appeared in 28% of the cases

in the 1992 Term -

a fourteen-fold increase over the 1981 Term." Dictionary

definitions appeared in 26% of the cases in 1995. Of the nine justices, the one clearly

identified textualist, Justice Scalia, had thirteen of the thirty cites to dictionaries in
1995. No one else was even close. Justice O'Connor was second with five."'
Strictly speaking, in terms of this article, I am dealing with definitions of words in
statutes. However, the justices on occasion trotted out their dictionaries to define
words in regulations and also in the Constitution as well 'as in the statutes." 6
Moreover, the justices used legal dictionaries in addition to ordinary dictionaries."7

114. See id. at 143:3; see also id. at 1454 app.
115. The totals for 1995 are: Scalia 13; O'Connor 5; Thomas 4; Breyer 3; Ginsburg 2; Stevens 2;
Kennedy 1; Rehnquist 0; Souter 0.
116. Justice BreyerJustice Breyer defined "employee' within the terms of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 152(3) (1994) by citing AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1992) and BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990). See NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 116 S. Ct. 450, 453-54 (1995).
Justice Breyer defined "collect" in the context of the Fair Debt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)
(1994) by citing to BLACK'S LAW DICTONARY (6th ed. 1990). See Heintz v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 1489,
1490 (1995).
Justice Ginsburg Justice Ginsburg defined "equitable" in 28 U.S.C. § 1552(b) (1994) citing AMERICAN HERITAGE
DICrIONARY (3d ed. 1952) and WEBSTER'S NINTH NEw COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1983). See Things
Remembered, Inc. v. Pe rarca, 116 S. Ct. 494, 499 (1995).
Justice Kennedy Justice Kennedy defined "prospectus" as used in the 1933 Securities Act, 12 U.S.C. § 77b(10) (1994)
using BLACK'S LAW DIC.IONARY (2d ed. 1910). See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 115 S. Ct. 1061, 1070
(1995). The third edition of Black's Law Dictionarywas not published until 1933. Presumably, Justice
Kennedy felt that the third edition was not yet published at the time the Securities Act was being
considered. Therefore, h, may have felt that the appropriate definition to use was the one in print at that
time - from the second edition.
Justice O'Connor Justice O'Connor defined "use" in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (1994) using WEBsTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (2d ed. 1949) and BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY (6th
ed. 1990). See Bailey v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 501, 506 (1995). This statutory section was passed
into law in 1968 and amended several times after that. Her use of the 1949 Webster's Dictionarymay
simply have been arbitrary.
Justice O'Connor defined "procedure" in the context of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 11C2(b)(3) (1994) by citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
(1976) and RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (2d ed. 1987). See Curtiss-Wright
Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 115 S. Ct. 1223, 1229 (1995).
She defined "injure" in 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1994) using WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY (1983). See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or., 115 S. Ct.
2407, 2419 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Justice Scalia Justice Scalia defined "take" in the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1532(19), 1538(a)(1) (1994)
and in 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1994) by citing 11 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1933) and WEBSTER'S Nmv
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGUSH LANGUAGE (2d ed. 1949). See Babbitt, 115 S. Ct. at 2422
(Scalia, J., dissenting). Textualists would normally seem to want quite recent dictionaries so as to give
a contemporaneous plain meaning. However, Justice Scalia may have chosen dictionaries that would
have been in use when the legislation was originally passed. The second edition of the Oxford English
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Dictionary was published in 1989. The Endangered Species Act was originally passed in 1973.
Justice Scalia defined "harm" in the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (1994) and in 50
C.F.R. § 17.3 (1994) citing 1 N. WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(1828), AMERICAN COLLEGE DICTIONARY (1970), J.OPDYCKE, MARK MY WORDS: A GUIDE TO
MODERN USAGE AND EXPRESSION

(1949), and

AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH

LANGUAGE (1981). See Babbitt, 115 S. Ct. at 2423 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
He defined "proximate" in 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1994) using BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)

and

WEBsTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE

(2d ed. 1949). See

Babbitt, 115 S.Ct. at 2429-30 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
Scalia defined "endeavor" in 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (1994), citing to 1 NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY (1993). See United States v. Aguilar, 115 S.Ct. 2357, 2367 (1995) (Scalia, J.,
concurring
in part and dissenting in part).

He defined "corruptly" as used in 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (1994) using BALLENTINE'S

LAW DICTIONARY

(3d ed. 1969) and BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990). See Aguilar, 115 S.Ct. at 2370 (Scalia,
J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Justice Scalia defined "market" in the Plant Variety Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2541(3) (1994), by
citing OXFORD UNIVERSAL DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1955) and WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
(2d ed. 1950). See Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 115 S. Ct. 788, 793 (1995). The Plant Variety
Protection Act was passed in 1970.
Justice Stevens Justice Stevens defined "harm" in the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (1994) and 50
C.F.R. § 17.3 (1994) using WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1966). See Babbitt,
115 S. Ct. at 2412.

Justice Stevens defined "shows" as used in 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994) by citing WEBSTER'S NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1942). See Hubbard v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 1754, 1758 (1995).
Justice Thomas Justice Thomas defined "commerce" in the commerce clause of the United States Constitution, U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, citing I S. JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed. 1773), N.
BAILEY, AN UNIVERSAL ETYMOLOGICAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY (26th ed. 1789), T. SHERIDAN, A
COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (6th ed. 1796), and 3 OXFORD ENGLISH

DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989). See United States v. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 1643 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
117. The total number of cites to the various dictionaries cited:
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH

LANGUAGE (1981)
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1992)
BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1969)

1
2
1

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)

6

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1910)
WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1983)
WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE

1
2

ENGLISH LANGUAGE (2d ed. 1942)

(2d ed. 1949)
(2d ed. 1950)
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1966)
(1976)
RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE

(2d ed. 1987)
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1933)

(2d ed. 1987)
OXFORD UNIVERSAL DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1955)
N. WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1996

1

3
1
1
1

1
1
1
1

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:573

The Tenth Circuit in 1995, issuing many more opinions than the Supreme Court,'
only had thirteen cites to dictionaries with Judge Baldock having seven by himself."'
Also, the judges used legal dictionaries in addition to ordinary dictionaries."

LANGUAGE (1828)
AMERICAN COLLEGE DICTIONARY (1970)
J. OPDYCKE, MARK MY WORDS: A GUIDE TO MODERN
USAGE AND EXPRESSION (1949)
S. JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE

(4th ed. 1773)

1
1
1

1

N. BAILEY, AN UNIVERSAL ETYMOLOGICAL ENGLISH

DICIONARY (26th ed. 1789)

1

T. SHErIDAN, A COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH

LANGUAGE (6th ed. 1796)

1

118. The Tenth Circuit had 449 published opinions in 1995 compared to the Supreme Court's 82
opinions in 1995.

119. Judge Aldisert
Judge Aldisert defined "minimum" in 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (1994) using WEBSTER'S THIRD NEw
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1968). See United States v. Gray, 56 F.3d 1219, 1225 (10th Cir. 1995).

Judge Baldock Judge Baldock defined "liable" and "with" in the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 509(A) (1994) citing
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979). See In re Slomans, 69 F.3d 468, 473 (10th Cir. 1995). It is
not clear why Judge Baldock used the fifth edition of Black's Law Dictionaryrather than the more recent
sixth edition, published in 1990.
Judge Baldock defined "mixture" in 21 U.S.C. § 841 (1994) using WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1986) and United States v. Chapman, 500 U.S. 453, 462 (1990)
(Rehnquist, J.) (citing 9 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989)). See United States v. Richards,
67 F.3d 1531, 1538 (10th Cir. 1995) (Baldock, J., dissenting).
He defined the words "furnish," "supply," and "give" in 42 U.S.C. § 1383(g)(3) (1994) citing BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990) and WEBSTER'S NINTH NEw COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1984). See
Johns v. Stewart, 57 F.3d 1544, 1556 (10th Cir. 1995).
Judge Vazquez Judge Vazquez defined "misrepresent" in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, sec. 2F1. 1(b)(3)(A) using
RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1993). See United States v. Frazier, 53 F.3d 1105,
1112 (10th Cir. 1995) (Vazquez, J., concurring).
Judge Brown Judge Brown defined the word "know" in 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1) (1994) using WEBSTER'S THIRD
NEw INTERNATIONAL DiCrONARY (1961). See United States v. Young, 45 F.3d 1405, 1413 (10th Cir.
1995).
Judge Henry -

Judge Henry defined "corruptly" in 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (1994) citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th
ed. 1990). See United States v. Bailey, No. 94-5219, 1995 WL 716276, at *3 (10th Cir. Nov. 22, 1995).
Judge Jenkins Judge Jenkins defined the word "as" in the phrase "as of the date of death" in N.M. STAT. ANN. § 412-2 (Michie Repl. Pamph. 1989) using WEBSTER'S THIRD NEw INTERNATIONAL DICnONARY (1971). See
Lujan v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 69 F.3d 1511, 1520 (10th Cir. 1995).
Judge Moore Judge Moore defined "community" in 18 U.S.C. § 1151(b) (1994) using WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY (1975) and WEBSTER'S THIRD NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (no date given). See

Pittsburg & Midway Coal Mining Co. v. Watchman, 52 F.3d 1531, 1544 (10th Cir. 1995).
120. The judges cited to the following dictionaries:
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)
1
(6th ed. 1990)
3
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When a word in a statute is unclear, there is an almost irresistible impulse to reach
for sources outside the statute. If legislative history is off-limits, dictionaries present
a tempting alternative.'
"Yet citing to dictionaries creates a source of optical
illusion ... - when appearance may be all there is .... Words in the definition are
defined by more words, as are those words. The trail may be endless."' " Judge
Seymour of the Tenth Circuit quoted from Learned.Hand: "Thus it is not enough for
the judge just to use a dictionary. If he should do ho more, he might come out with
a result which every sensible man would recognize to be quite the opposite of what
was really intended, which would contradict or leave unfulfilled its plain purpose."'"
When using a dictionary, the Supreme Court justices or the Tenth Circuit judges never
explain why they are using a particular dictionary or even why the date of the
particular dictionary is relevant. The dates vary widely.u The reader infers that
judges look for dictionaries containing the definitions they want. "If the court relies
on a dictionary, it should make at least some prima facie argument about the relevance
of that particular dictionary for interpretation of the statute ... under consideration."'' Logically, the court should ask whether a definition truly fits with the
popular understanding of a term, and it should try to identify a normal meaning rather
than merely a permissible meaning."
Justice Scalia
Justice Scalia is easily the most prominent of the textualists. "Unless there is a clear
statement to the contrary within the text of the statute, Justice Scalia will assume that
terms have their ordinary or commonly-understood meanings."'" He suspects any
legislative history if it is aimed at influencing judicial construction rather than
explaining legislative action, and he believes that committee reports are the principal
vehicles for such abuse." According to Justice Scalia and other critics, less reliance
should be placed on legislative history, and the relative importance of committee

WEBSTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICIONARY (1961)

1

(1968)
(1971)
OXFORD ENGISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989)
RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1993)

3
1
1
1

WEBSTER's NEw COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1975)
WEBSTER NINTH NEw COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1984)

1
1

121. See Randolph, supra note 33, at 72.
122. Id.
123. United States v. Richards, 67 F.3d 1531, 1535 (10th Cir. 1995) (quoting LEARNED HAND, HOW
FAR IS A JUDGE FREE IN RENDERING A DECISiON? in THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 103, 106 (Irving Dilliard
ed., 1952)).
124. See supra notes 118-21.
125. Looking It Up, supra note 8, at 51.
126. See id.
127. Bradley C. Karkkainen, Plain Meaning: Justice Scalia's Jurisprudence of Strict Statutory
Construction, 17 HARV. J.L & PUB. POLY 401, 407 (1994).
128. See Costello, supra note 47, at 61.
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reports and floor debate should be reversed."' Thus, in a 1995 dissent Justice Scalia
wrote:
Even if legilative history were a legitimate and reliable tool of
interpretation (which I shall assume in order to rebut the Court's claim);
and even if it could appropriately be resorted to when the enacted text is
as clear as this... here it shows quite the opposite of what the Court
13
says. 0
And:
There is little fear, of course, that giving no effect to the relevant portions
of the Committee Reports will frustrate the real life expectations of a
majority of tha members of Congress. If they read and relied on such
tedious detail on such an obscure point ... the Republic would be in
31
grave peril.
Justice Scalia argues that the Court should rely on plain meaning unless, by doing
so, it produces patently absurd results." One critic of this approach raises the
question: "Does legilative history somehow become reliable in the event of an absurd
statutory text, while remaining unreliable in other circumstances?"'
Karkkainen
argues that if legislative history can set us straight in the event of an absurdity,
perhaps it can also lrevent a simple misreading of the statute.'" "For Justice Scalia,
the response must be, that in the event of absurdity, all bets are off .... ,, In 1991,
in Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier," seven other justices signed Justice
White's majority opinion in which he pointedly rejected Justice Scalia's critique of
legislative history and insisted that courts would continue to use legislative history."
Another critic points out the problem of reliability and subjectivity in Justice Scalia's
approach.
[H]is interpretation is limited only by the range of his intellect and
common sense. Although intellect and common sense may be valuable
attributes in the field of statutory interpretation, they are no substitute for
the words of the statute as contextualized by the legislative history.
Fidelity to a broad plain-meaning approach that expands and circumvents

129. See id. at 41.

130. Babbitt v. Sweut Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or., 115 S. Ct. 2407, 2426-27
(1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting).

131. Id. at 2429 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
132. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,452 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[Ilf the language

of a statute is clear, that language must be given effect - at least in the absence of a patent absurdity.").
133. Karkkainen, supra note 127, at 422.
134. See id.

135. Id.
136. 501 U.S. 597 (1991).
137. See id at 610 n.4 (noted by Ross, supra note 55, at 574).
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approved text and allows substitution of personal context is also unreliable.'
Other Justices

Justice Scalia has led the textualist movement, claiming that the plain meaning of
the statute should be given effect. Justices Kennedy and Thomas are adherents to this
point of view also. In MetropolitanStevedore Co. v. Rambo,"" Justice Kennedy said:
"Given that the language of § 22 and the structure of the Act itself leave little doubt

as to Congress' intent, any argument based on legislative history is of minimal, if any,
relevance."'"

Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas often rely on textualism to

justify their decisions, but an equally conservative Chief Justice Rehnquist does not
hesitate to rely on legislative history to support a specific result. 4' "He has generally

declined to join in Justice Scalia's diatribes against legislative history, and has

frequently associated himself with opinions that Justice Scalia finds objectionable."'42

Justice Breyer encourages the careful use of legislative history in interpreting

43
statutes. He notes that his arguments are more pragmatic than theoretical.
"[L]egislative history helps appellate courts reach interpretations that tend to make the
law itself more coherent, workable, or fair."'" "Legislative history helps a court
understand the purpose of a statute."'45 Justice Stevens also has emerged "as a
forceful defender of the search for legislative intent and the use of legislative

history."'"

138. Stephen A. Plass, The Illusion and Allure of Textualism, 40 VILL. L. REv. 93, 125 (1995).
139. 115 S. Ct. 2144 (1995).
140. Id at 2149. Justice Kennedy was referring here to committee reports accompanying three
different amendments to section 22 of the Longshore and Harbor Workers Compensation Act.
141. See Ernest Gellhom, Justice Breyeron StatutoryReview and Interpretation,8 ADMIN. L.J. AM.
U. 755, 760 (1995).
142. Thomas W. Merrill, Chief Justice Rehnquist, Pluralist Theory, and the Interpretation of
Statutes, 25 RUTGERs LJ. 621, 653 (1994). Merrill cited to Rehnquist's opinions in: United States v.
Thompson/Center Arms Co., 504 U.S. 505 (1992) (plurality opinion); Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v.
Mortier, 501 U.S. 597 (1991); Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103 (1990); Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch.
Dist., 491 U.S. 701 (1989). "Thus, the most that can be inferred ... is that Chief Justice Rehnquist cares
less about the controversy over the use of legislative history than Justice Scalia does." Merrill, supra,
at 653.
143. See Breyer, supra note 30, at 847.
144. Id.
145. d at 848.
146. See Merrill, supra note 102, at 357. However, Justice Stevens is not doctrinaire. Notice his
comment in Hubbard v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 1754 (1995):
Although the historical evolution of a statute - based on decisions by the entire Congress should not be discounted for the reasons that may undermine confidence in the significance of
excerpts from congressional debates and committee reports, a historical analysis normally provides
less guidance to a statutes meaning than its final text.
Id. at 1759.
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Statistics (1995)
Supreme Court
Judge Wald pointd out that the Supreme Court checked on legislative history in
almost every statutory case decided in 19 8 1."e In 1989, the Court decided ten out
of about sixty-five statutory cases without any reference to legislative history at all,
although in several of those ten cases a dissent or concurrence did cite to legislative
history.' " In the 19590 Term, the Court decided nineteen of approximately fifty-five
statutory cases without the use of legislative history."4 9 In the 1992 Term, the Court
decided six of forty-one statutory cases without the use of legislative history."2 By
my count and analysis for the year 1995, the Supreme Court decided twenty-two out
of fifty-one statutory cases without the use of legislative history. Thus, our
percentages of statutory cases decided without the use of legislative history for those
four years:
1989
1990
1992
1995

15.5%
34.6%
14.7%
43.1%

Justice Scalia has been on the Court since 1986, so, while his views on the worth and
uses of legislative history have apparently had an effect, no clear trend is evident.
Thomas Merrill commented: "A better explanation for the triumph of textualism... lies not so much in Justice Scalia's persuasiveness as in his persistence."'' Merrill says that the critical factor is Justice Scalia's practice of refusing
to join any part of another Justice's opinion that relies on legislative history and that
Justice Thomas has taken up a similar stance." If that practice was true in the 1992
Term, it certainly was not true in 1995. In 1995, the Court handed down eighty-two
opinions. Of these, fifty-one dealt with statutory interpretation. There were eleven
opinions in which Justice Scalia or Justice Thomas or, more usually, both joined
another Justice's opinion even though he or she used legislative history to bolster his
or her opinion.'
147. See Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981
Supreme Court Term, 68 IowA L. REv. 195, 197 (1983) ("Not once last Term was the Supreme Court
sufficiently confident of the clarity of statutory language not to double check its meaning with the
legislative history.").

148. See Patricia M, Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in Construing
Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U. L. REv. 277, 288, 298-99
(1990).

149. See Breyer, supra note 30, at 846.
150. See Wald, supra note 67, at 49. However, statistics vary wildly for the 1992 Term. Thomas
Merrill says there were sixty-six statutory interpretation cases in the 1992 Term, and forty-one of them
(62%) did not mention legislative history. He also said that only twelve of the cases (18%) made
substantial use of legislative history. See Merrill, supra note 102, at 355.
151. Merrill, supra rote 102, at 365.
152. See id
153. Thompson v. Keohane, 116 S. Ct. 457 (1995) (Ginsburg, J.)(Justice Scaliajoined); Field v.
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Another aspect to the analysis is the Court's willingness to find a statutory "plain
meaning" compared to its willingness to consult legislative history. In this context,
William Eskridge worked up an interesting table for the Supreme Court: 5
1988

1987

1986

1995

Term

Term

Term

Year

Opinions

83

81

82

34

Court Finds Statutory Plain
Meaning

32

37

28

12

Legislative History Used to
Confirm Plain Meaning

11

15

18

20

Legislative History Used to Get
Around Apparent Meaning

4

3

7

2

Number of Substantial

Statutory Interpretation

The 1995 figures are based on my analysis. The one notable difference is that in
1995, as a percentage, the Court used legislative history much more to confirm plain
meaning than in the three terms Professor Eskridge analyzed."~
Finally, it is of some interest to note how often the different justices cited to

legislative history in 1995 and to see to what kinds of legislative history materials they
cited. (Opinions include majority, concurrences, and dissents.)

Mans, 116 S. Ct. 437 (1995) (Souter, J.) (Justice Thomas joined); Libretti v. United States, 116 S. Ct.
356 (1995) (O'Connor, J.) (Justices Scalia and Thomas joined); Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995)
(Kennedy, J.) (Justices Scalia and Thomas joined); Metropolitan Stevedore Co. v. Rambo, 115 S. Ct.
2144 (1995) (Kennedy, J.) (Justices Scalia and Thomas joined); New York State Conference of Blue
Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct. 1671 (1995) (Souter, J.) (Justices Scalia and
Thomas joined); Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 115 S. Ct. 1493 (1995) (Rehnquist, J.) (Justices Scalia and
Thomas joined); Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291 (1995) (Breyer, J.) (Justices Scalia and Thomas joined);
Shalala v. Whitecotton, 514 U.S. 268 (1995) (Souter, J.) (Justices Scalia and Thomas joined); Qualitex
Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., 514 U.S. 159 (1995) (Breyer, J.) (Justices Scalia and Thomas joined);
Milwaukee Brewery Workers' Pension Plan v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 513 U.S. 414 (1995) (Breyer,
J.) (Justices Scalia and Thomas joined).
154. Eskridge, supra note 48, at 657. Eskridge does not explain why his totals do not add up, i.e.,
for the 1988 term 32 plus 11 plus 4 does not equal 83, etc.
155. It is quite possible, however, that Professor Eskridge and I counted the use of legislative history
differently. For me, if a committee report or a hearing or floor debate was cited even once in connection
with the interpretation of a statute, I counted the case as one in which legislative history was used to
confirm plain meaning. Eskridge's methodology was not clear. See id at 656-57.
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Opinions

Breyer
Ginsburg
Kennedy
O'Connor
Rehnquist
Scalia
Souter
Stevens
Thomas
TOTALS

19
25
17
29
15
26
20
36
26

Cites to
Reports

[Vol. 49:573

Cites to
Hearings

Cites to
Floor
Debate

Cites to
Other
Materials

Total
Cites

12
5
5
3
2
2
3
9
2

4
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
0

2
0
0
1
0
1
1
3
0

1
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0

19
6
6
4
2
3
5
13
2

43

7

8

2

60

Disregarding the two cites to the other materials, 74% of the legislative history cites
are to reports, 12% of the cites are to hearings, and 14% of the cites are to floor
debate (the CongressionalRecord). The only baseline I know of for comparison is the
Carro & Brann study," which covered the years 1938-1979. In that study for the
three main types of legislative history materials, reports made up 57% of the total,
hearings made up 17%, and floor debate made up 2 6 %." In the Supreme Court in
1995, cites to committee reports were quite high as a percentage - despite Justice
Scalia's mistrust of their reliability and usefulness.
Major Controversies
One of the more spirited debates in 1995 over the uses of legislative history occurred
in the case of Gustafson v. Alloyd Co." It is particularly interesting because Justice
Kennedy, something of a textualist, wrote the majority opinion in the five-to-four
decision, and he was opposed by the diverse group of Justices Thomas, Scalia,
Ginsburg, and Breyer. Justice Kennedy held that the term "prospectus" in section
12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, which gives buyers of securities the express right
of rescission against sellers who make material misstatements or omissions by means
of the prospectus, referred to a document that describes a public offering of securities
by an issuer or controlling shareholder - not private agreements to sell securities."
Citing to a House Report, he noted that the primary innovation of the 1933 Act was

156. Jorge L. Cairo & Andrew R. Brann, The U.S. Supreme Court and the Use of Legislative
Histories:A StatisticalAnalysis, 22 JuRiMETRlcs J.294 (1982).
157 See id.at 304 tbl. II.
158. 115 S. Ct. 1061 (1995).
159. See id. at 1066-74.
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the creation of federal duties in connection with public offerings."w He also directly
confronted the dissenters:
In the name of a plain meaning approach to statutory interpretation, the
dissents discover in the Act two different species of prospectuses:
Nowhere in the statute,
formal... and informal prospectuses ....
however, do the terms "formal prospectus" or "informal prospectus"
appear. Instead, the Act uses one term - "prospectus" - throughout....
The dissenting opinions' resort to terms not found in the Act belies the
claim of fidelity to the text of the statute."6 '
Referring again to House Report No. 73-85, Justice Kennedy noted that the use of the
term prospectus to refer to public solicitations explains as well Congress' decision in
section 12(2) of the Act to grant buyers a right to rescind without proof of
reliance." Justice Kennedy also cited to United States v. Naftalin," which relied
upon a Senate Report showing that Congress decided upon a deliberate departure from
the general scheme of the Act in this one instance, and "made abundantly clear" its
intent that section 17(a) have broad coverage."M "The legislative history of the Act
concerning the precise question presented supports our interpretation with much clarity
and force."' "T
Justice Thomas in his dissent, joined by Justices Scalia, Ginsburg, and Breyer, said:
"Unfortunately, the majority has decided to interpret the word 'prospectus'... by
turning to sources outside the four comers of the statute, rather than by adopting the
definition provided by Congress.""M And: "Our mandate to interpret statutes does
not allow us to recast Congress' handiwork so completely."'" Justice Thomas, in
addition, said that the legislative history relied on by the majority and by the Court in
Naftalin does not support the conclusion that Congress wanted to extend section 17(a)
to secondary sales."
Justice Ginsburg in her dissent, joined by Justice Breyer, said: "Though the Court
cites legislative history to show Congress' intent to follow, rather than depart from, the
British statute, these sources suggest an intention to afford at least as much protection
from fraud as the British statute provides."" Justice Ginsburg noted that the House
Conference Report, which explains the Act in its final form, describes section 12(2)
in broad terms and nowhere suggests that the provision is limited to public of-

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

See id. at 1068 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 73-85, at 7 (1933)).
Id. at 1068-69.
See id. at 1070.
441 U.S. 768 (1979).
See Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1071 (citing Naftalin, 441 U.S. at 778 (citing S. REP. No. 73-47,

at 4 (1933))).
165. Id. at 1072 (citing H.R. REP. No. 73-85 (1933)).
166. Id. at 1074 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
167. Id. at 1076 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
168. See id. at 1078 n.2 ("The passage cited by the majority and by Naftalin, S. Rep. 73-47
(1933)... was unrelated to § 17(a), and instead discussed a Senate proposal which was replaced by
the House bill as the basis for the 1933 Act.").
169. Id. at 1081 n.3 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (referring to H.R. REP. No. 73-85 1933)).
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ferings.' Finally, Justice Ginsburg said: "I do not share the Court's view that Report
No. 85 speaks with clarity and specificity to the question at hand - § 12(2)'s
M

scope.''

The second major case in 1995 involving great controversy over the uses of
legislative history was Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communitiesfor a Great
Oregon." In that case parties who were allegedly dependent on the forest product
industry brought an action against the Secretary of the Interior and against the Fish
and Wildlife Service director, challenging a regulation promulgated by the Secretary
under the Endangered Species Act (ESA). Justice Stevens wrote the opinion for the
six-justice majority (Justice O'Connor concurring); Justice Scalia, joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, wrote an extremely vigorous dissent. Justice
Scalia commented generally: "Even if legislative history were a legitimate and reliable
tool of interpretation... and even if it could appropriately be resorted to when the
enacted text is as clear as this, here it shows quite the opposite of what the Court
says."'" Justice Stevens held that the Secretary's definition of "harm," within the
meaning of the ESA provision defining "take," as including "significant habitat
modification or degradation that actually kills or injures wildlife" was reasonable.'74
Justice Stevens noted that logging activities would have the effect of detrimentally
changing the natural habitat of two endangered species." He noted that "under
respondents' view of the law, the Secretary's only means of forestalling that grave
result - even when the actor knows it is certain to occur - is to use his...
authority to purchase the lands on which the survival of the species depends."' 76 He
noted that the House Conference Report said that "to be subject to the Act's criminal
penalties or the more severe of its civil penalties one must 'knowingly' violate the Act
or its implementing regulations. Congress added 'knowingly' in place of 'willfully' in
1978 to make 'criminal violations of the act a general rather than a specific intent
,,,
crime.
Justice Stevens said that "the Committee Reports accompanying the bills that became
the ESA do not specifically discuss the meaning of 'harm' but they make clear that
Congress intended 'take' to apply broadly to cover indirect as well as purposeful
actions.""I He noted that the Senate Report stressed that "[t]ake is defined.., in
the broadest possible manner to include every conceivable way in which a person can
'take' or attempt to 'take' any fish or wildlife."'" Justice Scalia dismissed this
statement from the Senate Report as an "empty flourish" and said that "to the effect

170.
(1933)).
171.
172.
173.

See id. at 108 1 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (quoting H.R. CONF.REP. No. 73-152, at 26-27
Id. at 1081 n.4 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
115 S. Ct. 2407 (1995).
Id at 2426-27 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (citation omitted).

174. See id. at2415.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

See id. at 2412.
Id.
Id. at 2412 n.9 (quoting H.R. CONF. REP. No. 95-1804, at 26 (1978)).
Id. at 2416.
Id (quoting S. REP. No. 93-307, at 7 (1973)).
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that 'this statute means what it means all the way' counts for little even when enacted
into the law itself.""lu Justice Stevens also noted: "The House Report stated that 'the
broadest possible terms' were used to define restrictions on takings [and it]
underscored the breadth of the 'take' definition by noting that it included 'harassment,
whether intentional or not."'"" 1 Justice Stevens commented that these Committee
Report comments were "ignored in the dissent's welcome but selective foray into
legislative history.""I
Justice Stevens noted that neither of the two endangered species bills included the
word "harm" in the definition of "take," "although the definitions otherwise closely
resembled the one that appeared in the bill as ultimately enacted.""l Justice Stevens
noted that "Senator Tunney, the floor manager of the bill in the Senate, subsequently
introduced a floor amendment that added 'harm' to the definition, noting that this and
accompanying amendments would 'help to achieve the purposes of the bill."'
Justice Stevens commented: "An obviously broad word that the Senate went out of
its way to add to an important statutory definition is precisely the sort of provision that
deserves a respectful reading.""lu Justice Scalia responded that Justice Stevens had
inflated the importance of Senator Tunney's statement.lu
Justice Stevens said that respondents made much of the fact that the Commerce
Committee removed the phrase "the destruction, modification, or curtailment of [the]
habitat or range" from the "take" definition before the bill went to the floor."u
Justice Scalia said that this removal of the phrase was "far more pertinent" than the
Senate floor manager's introduction of an amendment that added the word "harm" to
the definition of "take.""lu Justice Stevens responded: "We do not find [the removal
of the phrase] especially significant. The legislative materials contain no indication
why the habitat protection provision was deleted. That provision differed greatly from
the regulation at issue today.""Iu He went on to say: "We do not believe the Senate's
unelaborated disavowal of the provision in S. 1983 undermines the reasonableness of
the more moderate habitat protection in the Secretary's 'harm' regulation."'" Justice
Stevens noted that the respondents relied heavily on their argument that Congress
intended the acquisition provision to be the ESA's remedy for habitat modification on
a floor statement by Senator Tunney."9 Justice Scalia had said Senator Tunney's

180. Id at 2427 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
181. See id at 2416 (citing H.R. REP. No. 93-412, at 11, 15 (1973)).
182. Id.
183. See id (citing Hearings on S. 1592 and S. 1983 before the Subcomm. on Env't of the Senate
Comm. on Commerce, 93d Cong., 7, 27 (1973)).
184. Id at 2416-17 (citing 119 Cong. Rec. 25,683 (1973)).
185. Id. at 2417.
186. See id. at 2427 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
187. Id. at 2417 (citing 119 CONG. REc. 25,663 (1973)).
188. Id at 2427 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
189. Id. at 2417.
190. Id. (footnote omitted).
191. See id. at 2417 n.19 (citing 119 CONG. REc. 25,669 (1973) (statement of Sen. Tunny)). Senator
Tunny stated:
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statement was "direct evidence of what those who brought the legislation to the floor
thought it meant - evidence as solid as any ever to be found in legislative history,
but which the Court banishes to a footnote."'9" Justice Scalia went on to say that
both the Senate and House floor managers of the bill explained it in terms "which
leave no doubt tht the problem of habitat destruction on private lands was to be
solved principally by the land acquisition program."'92 He said that the floor
managers viewed habitat modification and takings as different problems, addressed by
different provisions of the Act: "The [majority] really has no explanation for these
statements."'' In that same footnote 19, Justice Stevens said that neither of the floor
managers' statements suggested that land acquisition would be the Act's exclusive
remedy for habitat modification by private landowners or that habitat modification by
private landowners stood outside the ambit of the statute.' 2 Justice Scalia responded:
That is to say, the statements are not as bad as they might have been.
Little in life is. They are, however, quite bad enough to destroy the
Court's legislative-history case, since they display the clear understanding
(1) that habitat modification is separate from "taking," and (2) that habitat
destruction on private lands is to be remedied by public acquisition."9
Justice Stevens want on to say that the history of the 1982 amendment that gave the
Secretary authority to grant permits for "incidental" takings provided further support
for his reading of the Act. 9 Justice Stevens noted that the House Report expressly
stated that "[b]y usc of the word 'incidental' the Committee intends to cover situations
in which it is known that a taking will occur.if the other activity is engaged in but
such taking is incidental to, and not the purpose of, the activity."'9 He said that the
reference to the foreseeability of incidental takings undermined respondents' argument

Many species have been inadvertently exterminated by a negligent destruction of
their habitat. Their habitats have been cut in size, polluted, or otherwise altered so that
they are unsuitable environments for natural populations of fish and wildlife. Under this

bill, we can taka steps to make amends for our negligent encroachment. The Secretary
would be empowered to use the land acquisition authority granted to him in certain
existing legislation to acquire land for the use of the endangered species programs ....

Through these land acquisition provisions, we will be able to conserve habitats necessary
to protect fish and wildlife from further destruction.
Although most endangered species are threatened primarily by the destruction of
their natural habitats, a significant portion of these animals are subject to predation by
man for commercial, sport, consumption, or other purposes. The provisions in S. 1983
would prohibit the commerce in or the importation, exportation, or taking of endangered
species ....

119 CONG. REG. at 25,869.
192. Id. at 2427 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
193. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
194. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
195. See id. at 2417 n.19.

196. Id. at 2427 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
197. See id. at 2417.

198. Id. (quoting H.R. REp. No. 97-567, at 31 (1982)).
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that the 1982 amendment covered only accidental killings of endangered and
threatened animals that might occur in the course of hunting or trapping other
animals."
Indeed, Congress had habitat modification directly in mind: both the
Senate Report and the House Conference Report identified as the model
for the permit process a cooperative state federal response to a case in
California where a development project threatened incidental harm to a
species of endangered butterfly by modification of its habitat.'
Justice Scalia said the 1982 permit provision did not support the regulation although
he acknowledged that the Senate Report and House Conference Committee Report
"clearly contemplate that it will enable the Secretary to permit environmental
modification."' Justice Scalia argued that the text of the amendment could not
possibly bear the asserted meaning when placed within the context of an act that must
be interpreted not to prohibit private environmental modification: "The neutral
language of the amendment cannot possibly alter that interpretation, nor can its
legislative history be summoned forth to contradict, rather than clarify, what is in its
totality an unambiguous statutory text."'
Many other Supreme Court cases in 1995 dealt with legislative history as well. See
Appendix A where these cases are detailed individually.
Tenth Circuit
One commentator has noted that the intense scholarly focus on Supreme Court
opinions exaggerates the role of the Supreme Court as the leading institution in
statutory analysis.' In large part this is a matter of numbers. In 1995 the Supreme
Court handed down eighty-two opinions. Fifty-one of these opinions dealt particularly
with statutes, and twenty-nine of these utilized legislative history. The Tenth Circuit
alone in 1995 handed down 1672 opinions of which 449 were published opinions. Of
the 449, 179 dealt particularly with statutes, and forty-four utilized legislative history.
Based on only one year's worth of opinions from only one circuit, firm conclusions
about lower federal court uses of legislative history are impossible. One can only say
that in 1995 about 25% of all the Tenth Circuit decisions dealing particularly with
statutes used legislative history to help interpret those statutes. Whereas in 1995 for
the Supreme Court about 57% of the decisions involving statutes used legislative
history to help interpret those statutes. Still, forty-four decisions in one year from one
circuit did use legislative history materials - and only one judge (Judge Baldock) was
noticeably ambivalent about their use.

199.
200.
(1982)).
201.
REP. No.
202.
203.

See id. at 2417-18.
Id. at 2418 (citing S. REP. No. 97-418, at 10 (1982) and H.R. CONF. REP. No. 97-835, at 30-32
Id. at 2428 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing S. REP. No. 97-418, at 10 (1982) and H.R. CONF.
97-835, at 30-32 (1982)).
l (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See Nehf, supra note 28, at 6.
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Note the kinds of legislative history materials the Tenth Circuit judges cited to in
1995.
Reports

Hearings

Floor
Debate

Legislative
History
Generally

Other

34

2

7

12

4

Disregarding the twelve nonspecific references to legislative history and the four cites
to other materials, 79% of the cites are to reports (Supreme Court: 74%), 5% of the
cites are to hearings (Supreme Court: 12%), and 16% of the cites are to floor debate
(Supreme Court: 14%).
Thus, Judge McKay cited Thornburg v. Gingles 4 as authority for its proposition
that "[c]ommittee reports accompanying ultimately enacted bills are a favored
authoritative source of legislative history."' Judge McKay stated:
Where the literal reading of a statutory term would "compel an odd
result," we must search for other evidence of congressional intent to lend
the term its proper scope .... Looking beyond the naked text for
guidance is perfectly proper when the result it apparently decrees is
difficult to fathom or where it seems inconsistent with Congress'
intention.'
Judge Tacha said: "In determining the meaning of a statute, we look at not only the
statute itself but also at the larger statutory context. We may ascertain the intent of
Congress through statutory language and legislative history."' Judge Kelly also
said: "We may ascertain the intent of Congress through statutory language and
legislative history."'
However, Justice Scalia's views on the uses of legislative history seem to have had
some impact on at least one Tenth Circuit judge, namely Judge Baldock. In 1995
Judge Baldock did not specifically note Justice Scalia and his views, but Judge
Baldock cited to dictionaries more than all the other Tenth Circuit judges combined,
and he also addressed directly the importance of the plain meaning view of statutory
interpretation. Thus: "In statutory interpretation we look to the plain language of the
statute and give effect to its meanings."2 3" And: "We will not restrict the plain

204. 478 U.S. 30 (1986) (Brennan, J.).
205. United States v. Gonzales, 65 F.3d 814, 821 n.4 (10th Cir. 1995) (citing Thornburg, 478 U.S.

at 43 n.7).
206. Id at 820 (quoting Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 454-55
(1989)) (omission in original).
207. Osborne v. Brbbitt, 61 F.3d 810, 812 (10th Cir. 1995) (quoting Utah v. Babbitt, 53 F.3d 1145,
1148 (10th Cir. 1995)).
208. Utah v. Babbitt, 53 F.3d 1145, 1148 (10th Cir. 1995).
209. Slamans v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 69 F.3d 468, 473 (10th Cir. 1995).
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meaning of the language chosen by Congress absent clearly expressed legislative intent
to the contrary." ' And: "[W]e must look beyond the literal language of the
[sentencing]21guideline if reliance on that language could defeat the plain purpose of
the statute." '
Judge Baldock, however, in 1995 was something of an anomaly on the Tenth
Circuit, and even he, on occasion, utilized legislative history. Also, other Tenth Circuit
judges mouthed platitudes about the importance of the "plain meaning" of a statute.
See Appendix B for specific uses by Tenth Circuit judges of legislative history
materials in 1995.
Conclusion
The theories of purposivism and intentionalism, both of which use legislative history
to interpret statutes, continue to play an important role. Committee reports, despite
Justice Scalia's doubts about their validity, continue to be cited to much more than
other kinds of legislative history - both by the Supreme Court and by the Tenth
Circuit.
With respect to agency interpretation of statutes, the Chevron test is alive and well:
If the statute is plain on its face, the Supreme Court and the Tenth Circuit do not turn
to the agency for help. If the statute is not clear, then these courts, by and large, give
deference to the agency's interpretation.
Textualists in their search for plain meaning like to rely on ordinary dictionaries
since their legal philosophy, by and large, prevents them from looking at legislative
history. Dictionaries would, one supposes, give the ordinary meaning of everyday
words. However, in their indiscriminate and seemingly arbitrary use of dictionaries,
textualists leave themselves open to criticism. At the very least, those judges who use
a dictionary to define a word should make a case why that particular dictionary is
relevant, perhaps in a footnote. This surely makes sense except for those dictionaries
which are very well known and very reputable such as the latest edition of Black's
Law Dictionary and the Oxford English Dictionary(2d ed. 1989).
Although more studies such as this will be needed, it may be significant that 1995
saw the lowest use of legislative history by the Supreme Court (57% in cases dealing
with statutory interpretations) of any of the four studies in the last eight years. Also,
where legislative history was used in 1995, it was almost always to confirm the plain
meaning of the statute - clearly more so than in the three other studies. Justices
Breyer and Stevens had a total of thirty-two cites between them in 1995 (see table on
p. 594), while Justices Thomas and Scalia had only five between them - and then
almost always to rebut other legislative history interpretations.
More studies are needed on the use of legislative history by circuit courts. My
analysis of the Tenth Circuit in 1995 is only a beginning. One can only say that this
particular circuit in this particular year did use legislative history materials to some
significant degree although no where near as great on a percentage basis as the

210. Johns v. Stewart, 57 F.3d 1544, 1555 (10th Cir. 1995).
211. United States v. Frazier, 53 F.3d 1105, 1112 (10th Cir. 1995).
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Supreme Court. Still, this one circuit had only one less reference to legislative history
materials than did the Supreme Court in 1995 (fifty-nine compared to sixty).
Using legislative history to interpret statutes continues, and suggestions for
improvement also continue. For example:
First, the Court should devote more of its energy to analyzing statutory
texts, through structural arguments, analogues from other statutes, and
consideration of consequences of an interpretation for the statute as a
whole.... Second, the Court should develop clear statement rules...
that obviate recourse to legislative history in a greater variety of
settings.... [W]here a statutory text is clear, and where that clarity is
consistent with the statutory structure and the apparent statutory policy,
the Court should not delve into legislative history. Third, the Court should
be more critical of the legislative history it uses, especially when the
statute is an old one and the immediate concerns of the legislative history
have been overtaken by changed circumstances 1
All that being said, however, the use of legislative history by the courts will no
doubt continue. Lawyers will continue to use in their briefs what they can find. Law
clerks for judges, except when given strict orders not to, will also seek to dig out what
is available. If anything, access to legislative materials is easier now with much more
materials on Lexis and Westlaw. Moderation and common sense are the keys. A
hardline position on either side is unhelpful. To use legislative history uncritically is
unwise. To never use legislative history, even when obviously relevant and valid, is
equally unwise.

212. Eskridge, supra note 48, at 625.
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APPENDIX A
Other 1995 Supreme Court Cases Dealing with Legislative History
In NLRB v. Town & Country Electric, Inc.,' 3 Justice Breyer, for the Supreme
Court, held that a worker may be a company's "employee" within the terms of the
National Labor Relations Act even if, at the same time, a union pays that worker
to help the union organize the company.2 4 To support a broad meaning of the
word "employee," he cited to one Senate Committee Report and to four House
Committee Reports: "And, insofar as one can infer purpose from Congressional
reports and floor statements, those sources too are consistent with the Board's broad
interpretation of the word."2 5
In United States v. Lopez," 6 Chief Justice Rehnquist, for the majority, held that
the Gun-Free School Zones Act, making it a federal offense for individuals
knowingly to possess a firearm near a school, exceeded Congress' Commerce Clause
authority, since the possession of a gun in a school zone was not economic activity
that substantially affected interstate commerce." 7 In his concurrence, Justice
Kennedy cited to 1963 Senate Committee on Commerce hearings and said: "[I1t
would be mistaken and mischievous for the political branches to forget that the
sworn obligation to preserve and protect the Constitution in maintaining the federal
balance is their own in the first and primary instance."2"8 Justice Breyer, in his
dissenting opinion, cited various hearings and one House and one Senate Report in
an effort to show the extremely serious problem of guns in and around schools and
how the decline in the nation's schools affects trade balances.2" 9
In Stone v. INS,' Justice Kennedy, for the majority, said that a timely motion
for reconsideration of a Board of Immigration Appeals decision does not toll the
22
Justice
running of the ninety-day period for review of final deportation orders
Breyer in dissent, joined by Justices O'Connor and Souter, cited to a House
Conference Report: "The legislative history is ...silent on the matter ...."'
In Heintz v. Jenkins,m a debtor brought a Fair Debt Collection Practices Act suit
against an attorney representing a creditor in litigation. The debtor alleged false
representations in the attorney's correspondence. Justice Breyer, writing for the

213. 116 S. Ct. 450 (1995).
214. See id.at 453-54.
215. Id. at 454 (citing H.R. REP. No. 80-245 (1947); S. REP. No. 74-573 (1935); H.R. REP. No. 74969 (1935); H.R. REP. No. 74-972 (1935); H.R. REP. No. 74-1147 (1935)).
216. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
217. See id.at 1631.
concurring) (citing Hearings on S.1732 Before the Senate Comm.
218. Id.at 1639 (Kennedy, J.,
on Commerce, 88th Cong. pts. 1-3 (1963)).
219. See id. at 1659-60 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing S. REP. No. 100-222, at 2 (1987); H.R. REP.
No. 98-6, at 19 (1983)).
220. 115 S. Ct. 1537 (1995).
221. See id. at 1544-45.
dissenting) (citing H.R. CONF. REP. No. 101-955, at 132-33 (1990)).
222. Id. at 1550 (Breyer, J.,
223. 115 S. Ct. 1489 (1995).
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Court, held that the Act applied to lawyers regularly engaged in consumer debtcollection litigation on behalf of creditor clients 2 When Congress considered the
Act, Justice Breyer said that some congressmen expressed fear that failure to pass
the Act would limft lawyers' "'ability to contact third parties in order to facilitate
settlements' and 'could very easily interfere with a client's right to pursue judicial
'
These congressmen proposed alternative language designed to keep
remedies.""tm
litigation activities outside the Act's scope, but that language was not enacted.'
In Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm,' securities fraud plaintiffs moved to reinstate their
time-barred Securities Exchange Act section 10(b) claims. Justice Scalia, writing
for the Court, held that Securities Exchange Act section 27A(b) violated
constitutional separation of powers principles by instructing federal courts to reopen
final judgments. t Justice Breyer, in his concurrence, noted also that section
27A(b) lacks generality, for it applies only to a few individual instances.'m Justice
Stevens, however, dissented, arguing that this section could apply retroactively
without violating constitutional principles tm He cited to a House Report which
noted that the habeas statute replaced a common-law writ and necessarily applied
retroactively." He also noted the remarks of Senator Bryan on the floor of the
Senate: 2 "All we seek ...is to give the victims [of securities fraud] a fair day in
o

court."t

In Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., 3 Justice Breyer, for the Court, held
that no special legal rule prevents color alone from serving as a trademark and that
the green-gold color of a manufacturer's dry cleaning press pads could be registered
as a trademark.' 4 Citing to Senate Reports, he noted that trademark law discourages those who hope to sell inferior products by capitalizing on a consumer's
inability to evaluate quickly the quality of an item offered for sale, ' s and the
Lanham Act significantly changed and liberalized the common law to "dispense
with mere technical prohibitions."' He also noted Senator DeConcini's remarks
on the floor that his bill was based on the Trademark Commission Report that "the
terms 'symbol, or device' ... not be deleted or narrowed to preclude registration of

224. See id. at 1490.
225. Id. at 1492 (citing H.R. REP. No. 99-405, at 11 (1985) (dissenting views of Rep. Hiler)),
226. See id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 99-405, at 11 (1985)).
227. 115 S. Ct. 1447 (1995).
228. See id. at 1456.
229. See id. at 1465 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing Hearings on H.R. 3185 before the Subcomm.
on Telecommunications & Finance of the House Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 102d Cong. 3-4
(1991)).
230. See id. at 1466 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
231. See id. at 1472 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 80-308 (1947)).
232. Id.at 1475 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing 137 CONG. REC.S18,624 (daily ed. Nov. 27, 1991)
(statement of Sen. Bryan)).
233. 115 S. Ct. 1300 (1995).
234. See id. at 1302-03.
235. See id. at 1303-04 (citing S. REP. No. 100-115, at 4 (1988)).
236. Id. at 1307 (citing S. REP. No. 79-1333, at 3 (1946)).
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such things
as a color, shape, smell, sound, or configuration which functions as a
,7
mark.
In Milwaukee Brewery Workers' Pension Plan v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 8
Justice Breyer, writing for the Court, said that the legislative history of the
Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act did not demonstrate that Congress
expressly rejected the idea of a funding gap between the valuation date at the end
of the plan year before withdrawal and the beginning of the year following
withdrawal. 9 Citing to a House Report, he noted that ERISA required employers
to make contributions that would produce pension-plan assets sufficient to meet
future vested pension liabilities; it mandated termination insurance to protect
workers against a plan's bankruptcy; and, if a plan became insolvent, it held any
employer who had withdrawn from the plan during the previous five years liable for
a fair share of the plan's underfunding. Citing to four different versions of the
bill, House Bill 3904, Justice Breyer noted that the valuation date and interestaccrual date changed in each version of the bill, which dispelled the notion that the
final version should be viewed primarily as a rejection of the funding gap found in
the original bill." 1
In Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 2 Justice Breyer, writing for the Court,
held that the Federal Arbitration Act section making enforceable a written arbitration
provision in a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce was written
broadly, extending the Act's reach to the limits of Congress' Commerce Clause
power." He said that the Act's legislative history indicated an expansive congressional intent and cited to a House Report and to joint hearings.' Citing to
additional hearings, Justice Breyer noted that the Act's supporters urged Congress
to model the Act after a New York statute that made enforceable a written
'
He also cited to a Senate Report,
arbitration provision "in a written contract."245
noting that Congress, when enacting the Federal Arbitration Act, "had the needs of
consumers, as well as others, in mind."'
In Thompson v. Keohane,' Justice Ginsburg for the Court held that state-court
determination as to whether a suspect was "in custody" at the time of interrogation
for purposes of Miranda was not entitled to statutory presumption of correctness
during federal habeas corpus review, but was a mixed question of law and fact

237. Id. (citing 133 CONG. REc. 32,812 (1987) (statement of Sen. DeConcini)).
238. 115 S. Ct. 981 (1995).
239. See id. at 991-92.
240. See id. at 985 (citing H.R. REP. No. 96-869, pt. 1, at 54-55 (1980)).
241. See id. at 991-92.
242. 115 S. Ct. 834 (1995).
243. See id. at 836.
244. See id. at 839-40 (citing Joint Hearingson S. 1005 and H.R. 646 before the Subcomms. of the
Comms. on the Judiciary,68th Cong. 7 (1924); H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 1 (1924)).
245. Id. at 842 (citing Hearing on S. 4213 and 4214 before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary,67th Cong. 2 (1923) (testimony of Charles L. Bemheimer)).
246. Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 97-542, at 13 (1982)).
247. 116 S. Ct. 457 (1995).
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warranting independent review by a federal habeas court.us She noted that 28
U.S.C. § 2254 "governs federal habeas corpus proceedings instituted by persons in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court. "U9 She also noted that the list
of circumstances warranting an evidentiary hearing in a federal habeas proceeding
was set out in a House Report.'m
In City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., Justice Ginsburg, for the majority,
held that rules that cap the total number of occupants to prevent overcrowding of
a dwelling fell within the section 3607(b)(1) exemption from the Fair Housing Act's
governance. m Citing to a House Report, she said that the statutory language
"surely encompasse[d] maximum occupancy restrictions."' She also noted, citing
to a House
hearing, that "landlords may refuse to stuff large families into small
tm
quarters.
In Director,Office of Wbrkers' Compensation Programs,Department of Labor v.
Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co.,'m the Director of the Office of
Workers' Compensation Programs sought judicial review of a decision by the
Benefits Review Board awarding an injured claimant only partial disability benefits
for the period of his unemployment under the Longshore and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act (LHWCA).' Justice Scalia, for the Court, held that the
Director was not the "person adversely affected or aggrieved" within the meaning
of the LHWCA by the Court's decision, and she thus lacked standing to appeal the
order, since the agency could not, absent specific authorization to appeal, be
adversely affected or aggrieved.'m In her concurring opinion, Justice Ginsburg
noted that Congress enacted the Black Lung Benefits Act (BLBA)P' in 1969 to
afford compensation to coil miners and their survivors for death or disability caused
by black lung disease. 9 Citing to a Senate Report, she noted that Congress
amended the BLBA to clarify that the BLBA continuously incorporates LHWCA
claim adjudication procedures.'m Citing to a Conference Report, she also noted
that "in the context of assuring automatic application of LHWCA procedures to
black lung claims, Congress added to the BLBA the provision for the Secretary of

248. See id. at 467.
249. Id. at 463.
250. See id. at 464 n.7 (citing H.R. REP. No. 88-1384, at 25 (1964)).
251. 115 S. Ct. 1776 (1995).
252. See id. at 1782.
253. Id. at 1781-82 n.8 (citing H.R. REP. No. 100-711, at 31 (1988)).
254. Id. at 1782 n.9 (citing FairHousingAmendments Act of 1988: Hearingson H.R. 1158 Before
the SubcornL on Civil & ConstitutionalRights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,100th Cong. 656
(1987) (remarks of Rep. Edwards)).

255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.

115 S. Ct. 1278 (1995).
33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1994).
See Newport News, 115 S. Ct. at 1283-84.
30 U.S.C. §§ 901-945 (1994).
See Newport News, 115 S. Ct. at 1289 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
See id. at 1290 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citing S. REP. No. 95-209, at 18 (1977)).
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Labor's party status in any proceeding relative to a claim for [black lung] benefits.""1
In Miller v. Johnson, Justice Kennedy, for the majority, held that: (1) a bizarre
shape of a congressional district was not the threshold requirement of claim of racial
gerrymandering; (2) the allegation that race was the legislature's dominant and
controlling rationale in drawing district lines was sufficient to state a claim;' and
(3) Georgia's congressional redistricting plan violated the equal protection clause.'
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act "require[d] Georgia to obtain either administrative preclearance by the Attorney General or approval by the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia of any change in a 'standard, practice,
or procedure with respect to voting."'" Citing to a House Report, Justice.Kennedy
said that section 5 was "directed at preventing a particular set of invidious practices
which had the effect of 'undo[ing] or defeat[ing] the rights recently won by
nonwhite voters.""' 7
In Libretti v. United States, Justice O'Connor, for the majority, dealt with a
forfeiture provision embodied in a plea agreement. The question was whether
forfeiture is a punishment. Citing to a Senate Report that dealt with the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 19 8 4 ,'9 Justice O'Connor said: "Congress plainly
intended forfeiture of assets to operate as punishment . . .,,0
In Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 1 retired employees sued their
employer under ERISA for wrongful termination of postretirement health care
benefits. Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court, held that one question was
whether the plan's amendment procedure was complied with.' Justice O'Connor
noted that the scheme conveyed enough detail to enable beneficiaries to learn their
rights and obligations under the plan at any time.m Citing a House Report, she
noted that the basis of the scheme is another of ERISA's core functional requirements, that "[elvery employee benefit plan shall be established and maintained
pursuant to a written instrument."'
In American Airlines v. Wolens,"s Justice Ginsburg, for the majority, held that
the Airline Deregulation Act"6 preempted claims based on the Illinois Consumer

261. Id. at 1290 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citing H.R. CONF. REP. No. 95-864, at 22-23 (1978)).
262. 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995).
263. See id. at 2486.

264. See id. at 2482.
265. See id. at 2490.
266. Id. at 2483.

267. Id.at 2493 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 91-397, at 8 (1969) (alterations in original)).
268.
269.
270.
271.

116 S. Ct. 356 (1995).
Pub. L. No. 98-473, Tit. 2, 98 Stat. 1837 (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
Libretti, 116 S. Ct. at 363 (citing S. REP. No. 98-225, at 193 (1983)).
115 S. Ct. 1223 (1995).

272. See id. at 1230.
273. See id. at 1229-30.
274. Id. at 1230 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1102 (1994) and citing H.R. REP. No. 93-1280, at 297 (1974))
(alteration in original) (emphasis omitted).
275. 115 S. Ct. 817 (1995).
276. Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (codified in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C. app.).
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Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Acttm but the Deregulation Act did not
preempt a state law breach of contract action alleging that the airline had violated
the agreement which it had entered into with its passengers."' Concurring in part
and dissenting in part and citing to a House Conference Report, Justice O'Connor
said that Congress had recently revisited § 1305 of the Act and said it did not intend
to alter the broad preemption interpretation adopted earlier by the United States
Supreme Court."
Celotex Corp. v. Edwards' concerned the jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, for the majority, dealt with the question of "related to"
jurisdiction. He said that the Congress did not delineate the scope of "related to"
jurisdiction, but its choice of words suggested a grant of some breadth."' Citing
to a Senate Report and to a House Report, he noted that the jurisdictional grant in
28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) was a distinct departure from the jurisdiction conferred upon
previous acts, which had been limited to either possession of property by the debtor
or consent as a basis for jurisdiction tm Justice Stevens, with Justice Ginsburg
joining, dissented, arguing that the bankruptcy judge lacked jurisdiction to issue an
injunction." 3 Justice Stevens noted that the jurisdictional structure of the
Bankruptcy Code reflected the decision in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v.
Marathon Pipe Line Co.,tm which in turn addressed the Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 19 7 8 .' Citing to a statement on the floor of Congress, he noted that the 1984
amendments regarding the powers of the bankruptcy court were passed to comply
with Northern Pipeline. 6 Citing a statement of Senator Hatch, Justice Stevens
also said that the primary effect of the 1986 amendments was to give the
bankruptcy judges the power to issue orders sua sponte and did not reflect any
expansion of the power of bankruptcy judges to enjoin other courts.'
In the case of Field v. Mans,' Justice Souter, for the Court, held that the fraud
exception to discharge in bankruptcy requires justifiable, but not reasonable,
reliance.' He noted that the House Report suggested that Congress wanted to
moderate the burden on individuals who submitted false financial statements, not
because lies about financial condition are less blameworthy than others, but because

277. See American Airlines, 115 S. Ct. at 823-24.
278. Id. at 826.
279. See id. at 832 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing H.R. CONIF. REP.
No. 103-677, at 83 (1994)).
280. 115 S. Ct. 1493 (1995).
281. See id. at 1498-99.
282. See id. at 1493 (citing S. REP. No. 95-989, at 153, 154 (1978) and H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at
43-48 (1977)).
283. See id. at 1503 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
284. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
285. See Celotex, 115 S. Ct. at 1504 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
286. See icL at 1509 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing 139 CoNG. REc. 20,089 (1984)).
287. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing 132 CONG. REc. 28,610 (1986) (statement of Sen.
Hatch)).
288. 116 S. Ct. 437 (1995).
289. See id. at 446.
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609

the relative equities might be affected by practices of consumer finance companies,
which sometimes have encouraged such falsity by their borrowers for the very
purpose of insulating their own claims from discharge.2'
In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,29 a subcontractor who was not awarded
a portion of a federal highway project brought an action challenging the
constitutionality of a federal program designed to provide highway contracts to
disadvantaged business enterprises. The Court, Justice O'Connor, held that all racial
classifications, imposed by whatever governmental actor, must be analyzed by the
reviewing court under strict scrutiny.' Justice Souter dissented, arguing that the
legislative schema had previously been justified as providing remedies for the
2
continuing effects of past discrimination and citing to a Senate Report. '
In New York State Conference of Blue Cross & hlue Shield Plans v. Travelers
Insurance Co.,. commercial insurers, fiduciaries for ERISA plans, brought suits
challenging New York statutes imposing surcharges on hospital rates for patients
whose commercial insurance coverage was purchased by employee health care plans
governed by ERISA and for surcharges on health maintenance organizations insofar
as their membership fees were paid by the ERISA plan. Justice Souter, for the
Court, held that section 514 of ERISA providing for surcharges did not "relate to"
employee benefit plans and, accordingly, was not preempted.29 According to
Representative Dent, a sponsor of the Act, the objective was to eliminate the threat
of conflicting and inconsistent state and local regulation. Justice Souter noted
that the history of Medicare' regulation made the same point, confirming that
Congress never envisioned ERISA preemption as blocking state health care cost
control, but rather meant to encourage and rely on state experimentation.'
In Shalala v.Whitecotton,"' Justice Souter, for the majority, held that a claimant
who shows that she experienced symptoms of injury after receiving a vaccination
did not make out a prima facie case for compensation under the National Childhood
Vaccine Injury Act,' where evidence failed to indicate that she had no symptoms
of that injury before her vaccination.' Citing to a House Report, Justice Souter
noted that for injuries and deaths traceable to vaccination, the Act established a
scheme of recovery designed to work faster and with greater ease than the civil tort
system.3"

290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.

See id. at 447 (citing H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 130-31 (1977)).
115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
Seeid. at 2113.
See id. at 2131 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing S. REP. No. 100-4, at 11 (1987)).
115 S. Ct. 1671 (1995).
See id. at 1676-83.
See 120 CONG. REC. 29,197 (1974) (statement of Rep. Dent).
See Travelers, 115 S. Ct. at 1682 n.6 (citing H.R. REP. No. 98-25, at 1 (1983)).
115 S. Ct. 1477 (1995).
42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1 to 300aa-33 (1994).
See Whitecotton, 115 S. Ct. at 1480.
See id at 1478 (citing H.R. REP. No. 99-908, at 3-7 (1986)).
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In Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, Justice Stevens wrote a concurring opinion and
cited to a Senate Report, noting that the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act - was originally a gap-filling measure intended to create coverage for
those workers for whom states could not provide compensation.3"

302. 115 S. Ct. 2172 (1995).
303. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1994).
304. See Chandris, 115 S. Ct. at 2199 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing S. REP. No. 69-973, at 16
(1926)).
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APPENDIX B
1995 Tenth Circuit Cases Dealing with Legislative History
Frymire v. Ampex Corp.3 5 was the only Tenth Circuit case in 1995 in which
both the majority and the dissent used legislative history to help make their case.
Writing for the majority, Judge Bright said: "Because the Worker Adjustment and
Retraining Act (WARN) is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation,
we would ordinarily turn to other legislative materials to ascertain Congress'
intent." Citing to a House Conference Report, however, he noted that Congress'
various attempts at clarification were susceptible to multiple interpretations.3"
Judge Kelley, concurring in part and dissenting in part, said that under the WARN
Act the majority held that the employer operated two separate sites for purposes of
determining whether the layoff met threshold requirements for WARN coverage."'
Judge Kelly found that a single site of employment was "not a situation in which
there were two separate plants or two separate mines, situations in which a finding
of multiple sites of employment would be appropriate."'
In United States v. Acosta-Olivas, 31 1 Judge Anderson noted that 18 U.S.C. §
3553(f) "was enacted as a safety valve to permit courts to sentence less culpable
defendants to sentences under the sentencing guidelines instead of imposing
mandatory minimum sentences."3M He noted that as the legislative history of the
section states, without such a safety valve, for the very offenders who most warrant
proportionally lower sentences - offenders that by guideline definitions are the
least culpable - mandatory minimums generally operate to block the sentence from
reflecting mitigating factors.
In United States v. Gomez,3 13 Judge Anderson noted that Congress considered the
circumstances under which the protections of the Speedy Trial Act3 4 could be
waived and limited waiver of the seventy-day speedy trial requirement to narrowly
dismissal prior to trial or prior to
defined circumstances, i.e., "a failure to move for
315
the entry of a guilty or nolo contendere plea.

305. 61 F.3d 757 (10th Cir. 1995).
306. Il at 771.
307. See id. at 771-72 (citing H.R. CONF. REP. No. 100-576 (1988) and S. REP. No. 100-62 (1987)).
308. See id. at 774 (Kelley, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
309. Id. at 775 (Kelley, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing United Paperworkers
Local 340 v. Specialty Paperboard, Inc., 999 F.2d 51, 56 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing H.R. REP. No. 100-576
at 1045 (1988))).
310. 71 F.3d 375 (10th Cir. 1995).
311. See id. at 378.
312. See id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 103-460 (1994)).
313. 67 F.3d 1515 (10th Cir. 1995).
314. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (1994).
315. lit at 1520 n.6 (citing United States v. Gambina, 59 F.3d 353, 360 (2d Cir. 1995) and United
States v. Pringle, 751 F.2d 419, 433 (1st Cir. 1984) (citing S. REP. No. 90-212, at 28-29 (1979))).
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In Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc. v. Duracraft Corp.,316 a fan manufacturer brought an action against a competitor, alleging the spiral configuration of the
competitor's grill design infringed the manufacturer's trade design. On the question
of the public's right to copy a patent, Judge Anderson noted that the legislative
history was ambiguous."' He said: "Because trademarks promote competition and
product quality, 'Congress determined that "a sound public policy requires that
trademarks
should receive nationally the greatest protection that can be given
318
th e m . ,'
In Murray ex rel. Murray v. Montrose County School District RE-1J,19 Judge
Anderson said that nothing in the language or legislative history of the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) suggested that Congress intended to
dispense with the use of summary judgment. 2 Without giving specific citations,
Judge Anderson said that legislative statements surrounding the enactment of the
IDEA did not clearly indicate that Congress, in discussing mainstreaming and the
concept of the least restrictive environment for each disabled child, meant anything
more than avoiding as much as possible the segregation of disabled children from
nondisabled children.3
In White v. York International Corp.,323 Judge Anderson interpreted the
Rehabilitation Act's "otherwise qualified" requirement in determining whether the
plaintiff was "qualified" under the Americans with Disabilities Act.3u
United States v. Bolton32 dealt with the interpretation of the Hobbs Act."z
Judge Baldock noted that the Hobbs Act regulates activities which in aggregate have
a substa~tial effect on interstate commerce.3 Citing to a House Report, he said
that Congress determined that robbery and extortion are activities which through
repetition may have substantial detrimental effects on interstate commerce'
In his dissent in United States v. Richards,3 Judge Baldock with respect to a
definitional issue srid: "The majority points to nothing in the statute, its legislative
history, or interpretative case law to indicate that Congress intended the words

316. 58 F.3d 1498 (10th Cir. 1995).
317. See id. at 1505 (referencing S. REP. No. 100-515, at 40 (1988)).
318. Id. at 1508 (qaoting Park 'n Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985)
(quoting S. REP. No. 79-1333, at 6 (1946))).
319. 51 F.3d 921 (0th Cir. 1995).
320. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1491o (1994).
321. See id. at 928 n.12.
322. See i. at 929.
323. 45 F.3d 357 (.0th Cir. 1995).
324. See id. at 360 v.5 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 101-485, at 23 (1990) ("The ADA incorporates many
of the standards of discrimination set out in regulations implementing section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973, including the obligation to provide reasonable accommodations unless it would result in
an undue hardship on the operation of the business.")).
325. 68 F.3d 396 (roth Cir. 1995).
326. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), (b)(3) (1994).
327. See Boulton, 68 F.3d at 399.
328. See id. at 399 (citing H.R. REP. No. 79-238 (1945)).
329. 67 F.3d 1531 (10th Cir. 1995).
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'mixture or substance' have different definitions in different subsections of [21
U.S.C.] § 841."'' 0
33
In United States v. Marchant,
' Judge Baldock noted that Congress enacted the
332
Gun Control Act,
"because 'it was concerned with the widespread traffic in
firearms and with their general availability to those whose possession thereof was
contrary to the public interest."'333 He quoted from a Senate Report: "The principal
purpose of the federal gun control legislation, therefore, was to curb crime by
keeping 'firearms out of the hands of those not legally entitled to possess them
because of age, criminal background, or incompetency."'" 4 Citing to a House
Report, Judge Baldock also noted that the Firearms Owners Protection Act increased
the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms' "ability to keep firearms out of the
hands of criminals. 335
In Snyder v. Shalala,3 Judge Baldock said: "If claimant were merely asking the
Secretary to increase the amount of her wages .... we would agree that 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(c)(5)(H) (1991), 20 C.F.R. § 404.822(e)(5) (1994), and relevant legislative
history authorize the Secretary to make such changes. 337
In United States v. Colorado & E.R.R., 3 Judge Barrett, citing to a Senate
Report, said:
With the enactment of SARA in 1986, Congress codified... [the]
implied right of contribution by amending CERCLA § 113 to expressly
recognize a right of contribution.... A principal objective of the new
contribution section was to "clarif[y] and confirm[] the right of a person
held jointly and severably liable under CERCLA to seek contribution
from other potentially liable parties, when the person believes that it has
assumed a share of the cleanup or cost 33
that
may be greater than its
9
equitable share under the circumstances."
Citing a House Report, Judge Barrett added: "[T]he burden of proof is on the...
party seeking apportionment to establish that it should be granted."'
In United States v. Browning," the issue was whether 18 U.S.C. § 3147
constituted a separate offense of conviction or merely a sentencing enhancement.
Judge Brorby for the court found it a sentencing enhancement and cited to the
legislative history of the provision, which reflected Congress' intent that the

330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.

Id. at 1543 (Baldock, J., dissenting).
55 F.3d 509 (10th Cir. 1995).
18 U.S.C. §§ 921-930 (1994).
Id. at 513 (quoting Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814, 824 (1974)).
Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 90-1501, at 22 (1968)).
Id. at 514 (citing H.R. REP. No. 99-495, at 3 (1986)).
44 F.3d 896 (10th Cir. 1995).
Id at 899 (emphasis added).
50 F.3d 1530 (10th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 1535 (citing S. REP. No. 99-11, at 44 (1985)).
Id. at 1536 (citing H.R. REP. No. 99-253 (III), at 19 (1986)).
61 F.3d 752 (10th Cir. 1995).
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potential for enhanced punishment serve as a deterrent to the commission of crimes
during bail release 3
Judge Burciaga in United States v. Grissom3 said the purpose behind' the
Victims and Witness Protection Act" was '"to restore the victim to his or her
prior state of well being' to the highest degree possible.""3
In United States v. Diaz-Bonilla,' Judge Cook found that in classifying a prior
state conviction for purposes of enhancement of a reentry offense, a felony was
defined by reference to the maximum penalty authorized for the offense by the state
statute of conviction, not by the classification applied by the state statute. 4 Citing
to a Senate Report, he said that "among the reasons the [Sentencing] Guidelines
were enacted was to 'eliminate indeterminate sentencing' and to 'make criminal
sentencing faster and more certain.' 3 "
Judge Ebel in United States v. Wacker?9 found the legislative history of the
Federal Youth Corrections Act35 indicated that the purpose of allowing a
conviction to be set aside was to offer the youthful offender a new start.351
In Bangerterv. Orem City Corp.,3 Judge Ebel said that the FHAA's prohibitions
clearly extended to discriminatory zoning practices.
The House Committee Report accompanying the FHAA states that the
FHAA "is intended to prohibit the application of special requirements
through land-use regulations, restrictive covenants, and conditional or
special use permits that have the effect of limiting the ability of [the
handicapped] to live in the residence of their choice in the com35' 3
munity.
Judge Henry, dissenting in Woods Petroleum Corp. v. Department of Interior,3
35
concluded, after considering the provisions of the Indian Mineral Leasing Act,
the accompanying regulations, and the Act's legislative history, that Congress
intended for the Secretary of the Interior to act as a fiduciary for Indian mineral
owners. "We deerm it significant that the Act was passed because, 'it [was] not
believed that the present law [was] adequate to give the Indians the greatest return

342. See id at 756 (citing S. REP. No. 98-225 (1983)).
343. 44 F.3d 1507 (10th Cir. 1995).
344. 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(1) (1994).
345. Id at 1515 (citing United States v. Hill, 798 F.2d 402, 405 (10th Cir. 1986) (quoting S. REP.
No. 97-352, at 30 (1982))).
346. 65 F.3d 875 (10th Cir. 1995).
347. See id. at 877.
348. Id. at 877 (quoting S. REP. No. 98-225, at 65 (1984)).

349. 72 F.3d 1453 (10th Cir. 1995).
350. 18 U.S.C. § 5021(b) (repealed 1984).
351. See id. at 1479 (citing United States v. Ashburn, 20 F.3d 1336, 1343 (5th Cir. 1994) (quoting
107 CONG. REc. 8709 (1961) (statement of Sen. Dodd))).
352. 46 F.3d 1491 (10th Cir. 1995).
353. Id. at 1498 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 100-711, at 24 (1988)) (alteration in original).
354. 47 F.3d 1032 (10th Cir. 1995).
355. 25 U.S.C. §§ 396a-396g (1994).
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from their property.' ' 3 As originally drafted, 25 U.S.C. § 396 authorized the
leasing of allotted lands without restrictions. However, Judge Henry, citing to a
House Report, said the Secretary of the Interior objected to the absence of
restrictions, observing that "[e]xperience has shown that this is unjust to the Indians,
as the inrush of prospective miners is always prejudicial to the Indians' interests,
and, in justice to them, the Department should not recommend
favorable action on
3 7
any bill that would render them insecure in their homes.
In Lujan v. Regents of the University of California,"' Judge Jenkins, citing to a
Senate Report, noted that the Price-Anderson Act359 was enacted to protect the
public and to encourage the development of the atomic energy industry.3 " Citing
to the same report, he said that although the statutory language' t appeared to
make it discretionary whether to require a limited waiver of any statute of
limitations defense, Congress and the courts have construed the Act and its
amendments as establishing a statute of limitations, as least for actions arising out
of an extraordinary nuclear occurrence.' Citing to a House Report, he noted that
exposure to radiation can occur without the slightest indication of its presence and
the effects of such exposure may lie dormant for years.' Thus, Congress was
aware of the potentials for injustice.
In Estate of Hoover v. Commissioner," Judge Kelly noted that under 26 U.S.C.
§ 2032A, the executor of an estate may make an election to value qualified real
property at the value for the use under which it qualifies; the use of real property
for farming or ranching purposes is enumerated as a "qualified use."' Citing a
House Report, he said that Congress enacted § 2032A to provide relief to the heirs
of family farms, who might be forced to sell their land to pay estate taxes if it were
valued at its fair market value based on highest and best use.'
In Utah v. Babbitt," Judge Kelly said the legislative history of the Indian
Mineral Development Act made clear that Congress intended the Navajos to benefit

356. Woods Petroleum, 47 F.3d at 1042 (Henry, J., dissenting) (citing Jicarilla Apache Tribe v.
Supron Energy Corp., 728 F.2d 1555, 1565 (10th Cir. 1984) (quoting S. REP. No. 75-985, at 2 (1937)))
(alterations in original).
357. Id. at 1043 (Henry, J., dissenting) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 60-1225, at 2 (1908)) (alteration in

original).
358. 69 F.3d 1511 (10th Cir. 1995).
359. Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576 (1957) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011 to 2297g-4
(1994)).
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.
368.

See Lujan, 69 F.3d at 1514.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n) (1994).
See Lujan, 69 F.3d at 1515 (citing S. REP. No. 100-70, at 15 (1987)).
See id. at 1518.
See id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 100-104, at 17 (1987)).
69 F.3d 1044 (10th Cir. 1995).
See id. at 1046.
See id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 94-1380, at 22 (1976)).
53 F.3d 1145 (10th Cir. 1995).
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from leasehold development: "provision is made for disposition of any revenue
arising from and oil and gas which might be discovered."3
In Werner v. McCotter 7 1 Judge McKay, citing to a Senate Report, said: "Courts
should continue to give 'due deference to the experience and expertise of prison and
jail administrators in establishing necessary regulations and procedures to maintain
good order, securty and discipline, consistent with consideration of costs and
limited resources."' 37'
In Hernandez-Avalos v. INS,3 Judge Reed noted that § 225 of the Immigration
and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994P' provides that no amendment
made by that Act and nothing in § 242(i) of the Immigration and Nationality
Ace 4 shall be construed to create any substantive or procedural right or benefit
that is legally enforceable by any party against the United States or its agencies. 75
Citing to floor debate, Judge Reed said that § 1252(i) was enacted for the benefit
of taxpayers, the objective being to save money by deporting criminal aliens as soon
as their sentences ended and thus avoiding the expense of housing and feeding them
'
while they awaited deportation; "[t]he legislative history makes this clear."376
3n
In Jane L. v. Bangerter, citing to a House Report, Judge Seymour said that a
prevailing defendant may recover attorney's fees only where the suit was vexatious,
frivolous, or brought to harass or embarrass the defendant. 8
In Richman v. S3traley,379 Judge Seymour, citing to a House Report, said:
"Congress did not view the fact that the same body both appointed and removed
bankruptcy trustees. as problematic. Instead, the existing system was tainted because
the trustees 'appeared in bankruptcy court before the very same judges who
appointed them.""'38
38
"
In United States v. Carrillo-Bernal,
' Judge Shadur, citing to two Senate Reports
and a subcommittee hearing, said: "The legislative history reveals a strong current
of congressional solicitude for the plight of a criminal defendant exposed to
additional expense and anxiety
by a government appeal and the incumbent
'3
possibility of multiple trials. 1

369. Id. at 1149 (citing H.R. REP. No. 72-1883, at 2 (1933)).
370. 49 F.3d 1476 (10th Cir. 1995).
371. See id. at 1479-80 (quoting S. REP. No. 103-111, at 9-11 (1993)).
372. 50 F.3d 842 (10th Cir. 1995).
373. Pub. L. No. 103-416, 108 Stat. 4305.
374. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(i) (1994).
375. See Hernandez-Avalos, 50 F.3d at 844.
376. See id. at 847-48 n.12 (citing 132 CONG. REC. H9794 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1986) (statement of
Rep. McKay) and 132 CONG. REC. S16,908 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1986) (statement of Sen. Simpson)).
377. 61 F.3d 1505 (10th Cir. 1995).
378. See id. at 1513 (citing to Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 n.2 (1983) (citing H.R. REP.
No. 94-1558, at 7 (1976))).
379. 48 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir. 1995).
380. Id. at 1143 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 99-764 (1986)).
381. 58 F.3d 1490 (10th Cir. 1995).
382. Id at 1495-96 (citing Anti-Crime Program:Hearings before Subcomm. No. 5 of the Comm.
on the Judiciary,90th Cong. 1530-33 (1967); S.REP.No. 85-1478, at 16 (1958); S.REP. No. 84-1997,
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3
In United States v. Reorganized CF&I Fabricators," the issue was whether a
court may subordinate a nonpecuniary loss tax penalty claim without a showing of
misconduct on the part of the government. Judge Tacha agreed with the analysis of
In re Virtual Network Services Corp.,3 which did a thorough analysis of the
legislative history."s

at 11 (1956) (noting that Congress was persuaded only as to drug cases)).

383. 53 F.3d 1155 (10th Cir. 1995).
384. 902 F.2d 1246, 1247-49 (7th Cir. 1990).
385. See Reorganized, 53 F.3d at 1248 (citing S. REP. No. 95-989, at 74 (1978); H.R. REP. No. 95595, at 359 (1978); 124 CONG. REC. H11,089-H11,117 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (statement of Rep.
Edwards); 124 CONG. REc. S17,403-S17,434 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (statement of Sen. DiConcini)).
However, Judge Tacha found this legislative history inconclusive. See id. at 1158-59.
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APPENDIX C
"Legislative history is not history in the usual sense of a narrative record or
interpretations of past events."3" A legislative history, instead, is the term used to
designate the documents that contain the information considered by the legislature
prior to deciding whether or not to enact a law. One purpose of a legislative history
is to facilitate one's understanding of the reasons behind an enactment of a law."7
This appendix discusses a specific area of legislative history - statutory
interpretation. It is, of course, possible to want to know the legislative history of a
bill that is pending or of a bill that was never enacted into law. However, lawyers,
judges, and legal scholars are usually much more interested in the legislative history
of a bill that is enacted into law. This legislative history is used to interpret a
particular statutory section or words or phrases in that section.
Many legal scholars and lawyers are unsure how to begin and where to look for
documents dealing with statutory interpretation on the federal level.
Legislative History: What It Is and Where To Find It
As mentioned above, in the general field of federal legislative history I am
interested in the specific area of statutory interpretation. I have cited two excellent
books on legal research which have good chapters on legislative history." '
In what follows, E will be quoting liberally from both, though, again, with my
focus particularly on statutory interpretation. One shortcoming of both of the
chapters mentioned above, at least when read in isolation, is that neither notes that
as far as interpreting legislative intent all legislative documents are secondary in
importance to case law. That is, a researcher needs to first find out if there is case
law analyzing the particular code section or act or public law or bill. If the Supreme
Court has already pronounced upon a certain point of statutory interpretation, no
more research may be needed. If the Tenth Circuit has analyzed a certain statute,
that would be less definitive than the Supreme Court's interpretation of the same
statute, of course, though still authoritative for cases involving statutory
interpretation appealed to that circuit. Of course, any case interpretation of a statute,
except that of the United States Supreme Court, can be treated as only persuasive
and therefore rebuttable. Thus, the normal legislative materials - committee
reports, committee hearings, and floor debate - could still be useful.
With the above caveat concerning case law research, let us next examine which
legislative documents to look for and where to find them. In particular, I will
discuss congressional bills, committee reports, committee hearings, and congressional debates. I will not discuss committee prints or presidential or executive
agency documents because my analysis of 1995 Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit
decisions show that these legislative materials are rarely used. The reader wishing

386. MORRIS COHEN Er AL, How TO FIND THE LAW 217 (9th ed. 1989).
387. See J. MYRON JACOBSTEIN ET AL, FUNDAMENTALS OF LEGAL REsEARCH 191 (6th ed. 1994).
388. See COHEN Er AL., supra note 386, ch. 7; JACOBSTEIN ET AL., supra note 387, ch. 10.
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to know more about these can consult the chapters in the two books mentioned
above.
CongressionalBills
A proposed piece of legislation is introduced as a bill or a joint resolution into
either the House of Representatives, where it is assigned an H.R. or H.J. Res. (for
Joint Resolution) number, or the Senate, where it is assigned either an S. or S.J.
Res. number. This number stays with the bill until it is passed or until the end of
the Congress in which it was introduced. (Each Congress lasts two years.) When
a bill is amended, it is usually reprinted with the amending language. The
comparison of the language of the bill, as introduced and its subsequent
amendments, with the final language as passed (the public law) may reveal
legislative intent, since the insertions or deletion of language may indicate a
legislative choice.3"
Therefore, the researcher needs to be aware of the following:
a. The bill as originally introduced in the House or Senate.
b. The bill with any amendments.
c. The bill as it passed in the originating body and as introduced into the other
house.
d. The bill as amended by the second house.
e. The bill as it is passed by the second house.
f. The bill as amended by a conference committee of the House and Senate.
g. The public law?'
However, in my experience, this obsessive comparison of different bills is not
done much. If the researcher does pursue this route, the best tool to use to figure
out which bill versions exist is the CCH CongressionalIndex. Commerce Clearing
House has published this since 1937, and it is widely available. It is updated weekly
while Congress is in session and for several weeks thereafter until all public bills
and resolutions sent to the President have been acted upon. New volumes are issued
for each Congress.39"'
The index's digest section provides the contents of each bill introduced in
Congress. There are status tables for pending bills in the Senate and in the House.
The status tables set forth actions (including amendments) taken on the bill, provide
committee report numbers, and notes if hearings were held and on what date.39
However, the CongressionalIndex does not contain the actual text of bills, debates,
reports, or laws. It is only a finding tool but a very useful one.
To get the full text of a bill and its various versions, the first choice is LEXIS
(LEGIS, CODES, and GENFED libraries; BLTXT file). The full text of bills are
available beginning with the 101st Congress (1989). Moreover, the researcher can

389. See JACOBSTEIN Er AL., supra note 387, at 193.
390. Id. at 193-94.
391. Each Congress lasts two years and is divided into the first session (the odd-numbered year) and
the second session (the even-numbered year). The 105th Congress began in 1997.
392. See JACOBSTEIN Er AL., supra note 387, at 206.
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use the LEXIS focus feature to easily find particular parts of bills. WESTLAW also
has the full text of bills in its CQ-BILLTXT database, beginning with the 103d
Congress (not included in law school subscription contracts) and in its CONGBILLTXT database, beginning with the 104th Congress (available to law schools).
If LEXIS is not an option, there are two microfiche collections:
(a) UnitedState CongressPublic Bills and Resolutions. This set, published by the
United States Government Printing Office, contains the text of all bills and
amendments since the 96th Congress (1979). Access to this set is provided by the
Microfiche Users/Bill FindingAid.
(b) CIS/Microfiche Library. From 1935, CIS provides reprints of the bills that
have become publiz laws.
Committee Hearings
"Hearings are held by the standing and special committees of the House and
Senate to investigate particular problems or situations, and also to elicit the views
of persons or groups interested in proposed legislation."3' "The hearings, as
published, consist of transcripts of testimony before a particular committee or
subcommittee, questions by the legislators and answers by witnesses, [and] exhibits
submitted by interested individuals or organizations. ..
"Committee hearings are technically not part of a legislative history since they do
not contain congressional deliberations but rather views of non-legislators of what
the bill under consideration should accomplish. [However, o]ften senators and
members of the House of Representatives may present testimony. Therefore,
hearings should be consulted ... because they frequently contain information
helpful to understanding why Congress adopted or did not adopt certain language
based on the testimony heard. . . .,"' "The testimony they contain may range
from the helpful and objective
views of disinterested experts to the partisan
'
comments of interest groups. 096
Congressional Information Service has published its legislative service CIS/Index
since 1970. CIS/Index offers the most complete and detailed indexing and
abstracting of the documents of legislative history, including hearings, for each
congressional session. From 1970 to 1983, two permanent volumes were published
for each year - an Index volume and an Abstracts volume, which included a
section providing cumulative legislative histories of enacted laws. The legislative
history for enacted laws has since 1984 appeared in a third annual volume called
Legislative Histories.
CIS gives the researcher the Superintendent of Documents (SuDoc) number by
which one can get the text of the hearing in a government depository library. CIS
also publishes in microfiche the full text of all Senate and House hearings.

393. COHEN ET AL., supra note 386, at 224.
394. Id.
395. JACOBSTEIN Ur AL, supra note 387, at 195.
396. COHEN Er AL.. supra note 386, at 224.
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On LEXIS, the researcher can also get the full text of many hearings from August
1988 via the Federal News Service (LEGIS library, FEDNEW file). On
WESTLAW one can check three different databases for hearings: U.S. Political
Transcripts (USPOLTRANS) beginning with February 1994; U.S. Congressional
Testimony (USTESTIMONY) beginning with January 1993; and Congressional
Testimony (CONGTMY) beginning with July 19, 1995. One would want to use CIS
as a guide and then check to see how many of the hearings are actually available
on LEXIS and WESTLAW. Hearings are often very long. By using the focus
feature on LEXIS or the locate feature on WESTLAW, one can find the particular
part of the hearing in which one is interested.
Committee Reports
Generally considered
[t]he most important documents of legislative history are the reports of
the Congressional committee of each house and the reports of conference committees held jointly by the two houses. The House and
Senate committees generally issue a report on each bill when it is sent
to the whole house for consideration. . . .These reports reflect the
committee's proposal after the bill has been studied, hearings held, and
amendments made. They frequently contain the revised text of the bill,
an analysis of its content and intent, and the committee's rationale for
its recommendations.397
"If different versions of a proposed enactment have been passed by each house,
a conference committee is convened, including members from each house. The
conference committee reconciles the differences and produces an agreed
compromise for return to both houses and final passage.... Conference committee
reports are a very persuasive source for interpretation. 3 98 "Committee reports and
conference committee reports are generally given more weight than any other
documents of legislative history, because they are produced by those members of
Congress who have worked most closely with the proposed legislation."3
The committee reports are published as single pamphlets in separate numerical
series for each session of Congress. CIS lists reports for each public law. Also, at
the end of the text for each public law in Statutes at Large there appears a
legislative history summary which includes citations of reports.
For the text of the committee report, the first place to check is United States Code
Congressionaland AdministrativeNews (USCCAN). From 1941 to 1986, USCCAN
usually only printed a House Report or a Senate Report. Starting with 1987, "it
expanded its coverage, usually including the House or Senate report and the
conference report.""' USCCAN is published by West and thereby has an
397. Id. at 227-29.
398. Id. at 229.

399. Id.
400. JACOBSTEIN ET AL, supra note 387, at 202.
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important connection with United States Code Annotated, also a West product.
After most code sections in USCA is a Historical Note in which the Legislative
History part refers to the text of the committee report in USCCAN which dealt with
that code section.
All committee reports are published in a bound series of volumes popularly called
the Serial Set, which is a government documents depository item.
On WESTLAW for the period 1948 through 1989, the LH database contains only
the full text of the reports that appeared in USCCAN. Beginning in 1990, this
database contains all committee reports. On LEXIS in the LEGIS library, CMTRPT
file, committee reports since 1990 are available.
CongressionalDebates
"Floor debate.. . on a pending bill.., typically takes place after the bill has been
reported out by committee. Arguments for and against amendments and passage are
made, [and] explanations of unclear or controversial provisions are offered ....
The essential source for this debate is the CongressionalRecord, which is published
daily while either house is in session.""1
"Some authorities claim that floor statements of legislators on the substance of a
bill under discussion are not to be considered by courts as determinative of
Congressional intent."' "The courts, however, generally do give some weight to
such statements, especially when they are made by the bill's sponsors, whose stated
intention is to clari.1' or explain the bill's purpose."' However, the "courts rely
more on committee reports than on legislative debates for aid in statutory
interpretation."'
The permanent bound edition of the CongressionalRecord has different pagination
than the daily paper edition. The permanent bound edition may not appear until six
years after the paper edition. However, when one uses CIS to determine the
pertinent documents for statutory interpretation, pagination is not a problem because
CIS with respect to debate in the CongressionalRecord only refers to the dates on
which debate took place. The CongressionalRecord is available in all government
depository libraries and is commonly available in even medium-size law libraries.
LEXIS (GENFED and LEGIS libraries; HOUSE or SENATE files) and
WESTLAW (CR database) both have the full text of the Congressional Record
from 1985. Moreover, LEXIS and WESTLAW are particularly useful to focus in
on the debate about a particular bill because of their "focus" or "locate" features,
respectively.

401. COHEN ET a,.. supra note 386, at 230.
402. JACOBSTEIN Er AL., supra note 387, at 196 (footnote omitted). But see Babbitt v. Sweet Home
Chapter of Communities for a Great Or., 115 S. Ct. 2407, 2427 (1995) (Sealia, J.,
dissenting).
403. JACOBSTEIN Er AL., supra note 387, at 196.
404. COHEN Er AL., supra note 386, at 239; see also supra tables at pp. 594, 600.
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Compiled Legislative Histories
"Legislative histories for major legislation, compiled in book form or [microform
or on line on LEXIS or WESTLAW], offer a convenient approach to the important
documents relating to some laws. At their best, these compilations include [the full
and [floor debate] with detailed
text of] bills, hearings, committee reports ....
history can save the researcher
legislative
compiled
A
comprehensive
indexing.
many hours of... time in retrieving those documents from their disparate sources.
Frequently, however, only some of the essential documents are included and often
indexing is omitted or inadequate." 5
The best finding tool for published legislative histories is Nancy P. Johnson,
Source of Compiled Legislative Histories: A Bibliography of Government
Documents, Periodical Articles and Books (1986 & updated periodically). 4"
"Arranged chronologically by Congress and Public Law number, it provides a single
checklist of all available compiled legislative histories [(except those on LEXIS and
WESTLAW)] from the 1st through the [101st] Congress .... " It is indexed by
the title and the name of the act.
"Many law firms compile legislative histories of enactments .... To improve
access to [these], the Law Librarians' Society of the District of Columbia has
prepared the Union List of Legislative Histories [(6th ed. 1991)] which lists
legislative histories held by its member libraries."'
Finally, LEXIS and WESTLAW have the compiled legislative history of certain
important acts in full text:
WESTLAW:
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA-LH).
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 (BANKR84-LH).
Bankruptcy Judges, U.S. Trustees & Family Farms Bankruptcy Act of 1986
(BANKR86-LH).
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (BANKR78-LH).
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, & Liability Act of 1980
(CERCLA-LH).
Employees Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA-LH).
False Claims Amendments Act of 1986 (FALSECLM-LH).
Family & Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FAMLV-LH).
Financial Institutions Reforms, Recovery & Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREALH).
Health Security Act - 103d Congress (HEALTH103-LH).
Insider Trading & Securities Enforcement Act of 1988 (INSIDER-LH).
Multiemployee Pensions Act of 1980 (MULTEMPL-LH).

405. COHEN ET AL., supra note 386, at 257.

406.
407.
408.
409.

See it
Id.
See id.
Id.
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Superfund Amendments & Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA-LH).
Tax Reform Act of 1986 (FrX-TRA86).
LEXIS:
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liabiliiy Act
(CERCLH file, ENVIRN library).
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 (CA9OLH file, ENVIRN library).
Clear Air Act Amendments of 1977 (CAALH file, ENVIRN library).
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery & Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA
file, LEGIS library).
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPALH file, ENVIRN library).
Superfund Amendments & Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA LH file, ENVIRN
library).
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